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Comment 
Mixing Oil & Water: Why Child-Custody 
Evaluations are not Meshing with the  
Best Interests of the Child 
Bari L. Nathan* 
 The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides the 
statutory requirements for marriage and dissolution of marriage in 
Illinois.  Section 604(b) gives courts the discretion to appoint an 
evaluator in order to aid in the determination of child custody by 
evaluating the relevant parties and writing a report.  If and when these 
604(b) evaluators are appointed, there are virtually no guidelines that 
set forth what they may or may not do in the course of their evaluations.  
As a result of this lack of guidelines, 604(b) evaluators often employ 
clinical assessment instruments (i.e., psychological tests that assess 
clinical constructs such as personality) in order to aid in coming to a 
conclusion concerning custody.  Judges often tend to favor an 
evaluator’s opinion and fail to notice the tests’ biases and lack of 
validity.  As a result, the main determinant in child-custody decisions 
often comes down to the conclusions of faulty psychological testing 
despite the fact that other more effective methods such as interviewing 
may have been used in the course of evaluation.  This process leaves 
much room for questioning whether the way child-custody evaluations 
are being employed are in fact serving the best interests of the child. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act (“IMDMA”)1 are to strengthen the integrity of marriage and 
safeguard family relationships, promote settlement of disputes, mitigate 
potential harm to spouses and their children, and crucially, to secure the 
maximum possible involvement of both parents regarding their 
children’s well-being.2  The language of the statute gives Illinois courts 
 
1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/101 (2014). 
2. Id. at 5/102; see In re Marriage of Wade, 946 N.E.2d 485, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“It is 
clear that the legislature intended for the circuit court to take the best interests and well-being of 
the parties’ children into account while conducting the proceedings on a dissolution of 
marriage.”); In re Marriage of Davis, 792 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he 
overarching purpose of the [IMDMA] is to promote the best interest of the children . . . .”). 
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the discretion to appoint an evaluator in order to help determine the 
outcome of custody decisions.3  While the statute effectively grants this 
authority to the courts, there are virtually no guidelines that set forth 
who the evaluator can be, what qualifications he or she must have, how 
the evaluators should conduct their evaluations, and what, if any, 
methods should be employed in the evaluation.4  In most cases, courts 
appoint mental-health experts like psychologists, psychiatrists, or social 
workers.5   
Given the flexibility that they have in conducting their evaluations, 
most of these mental-health experts choose to conduct psychological 
tests on the parents and child involved in the litigation in order to come 
to a conclusion regarding their recommendation to the court.6  This 
 
3. The statute uses the word “may” rather than “shall” to indicate that seeking the advice of 
professional personnel is discretionary, not mandatory.  See In re Marriage of Debra N. & 
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (acknowledging that it is within the court’s 
discretion to seek independent expert advice). 
4. David I. Grund & Danielle E. Kestnbaum, Child Custody Evaluations in the Circuit Court 
of Cook County and Throughout Illinois Do Not Serve the Best Interest of the Child: A Critical 
Consideration of the Flaws and Possible Solutions Thereto, in 2ND ANNUAL GRUND & LEAVITT 
SYMPOSIUM ON CUTTING-EDGE FAMILY LAW ISSUES COURSE NOTEBOOK § 2-1, at 2 (2014); cf. 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604.5.  In contrast to section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines, section 605.5 
evaluations, which are ordered at the request of one of the litigants, outline requirements for these 
evaluations, including the requirement that the court must designate the time, place, conditions, 
and scope of the evaluation.  “Section 605 provides the remedy intended by the legislature in 
cases where a party in a postdissolution proceeding seeks relevant evidence adduced in another 
postdissolution proceeding.”  Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ill. 2011). 
5. See In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that the 
testimony of psychologists is generally acceptable in child-custody cases); In re Marriage of 
Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that the testimony of the psychologist 
is not determinative of the issue of custody, yet it may be properly considered with respect to 
whatever enlightenment it may provide the court in identifying the best interests of the children); 
see also Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 332 (discussing how a psychiatrist was appointed by the court to 
conduct an independent evaluation and assist the court pursuant to section 604(b)); In re Marriage 
of Saheb and Khazal, 880 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (appointing a person with a 
doctorate in social work to evaluate the parties and minor child); People ex rel. Rathbun v. 
Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that the trial court appointed a 
clinical psychologist to interview the parties and everyone involved in the controversy and 
present recommendations to the trial court). 
6. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Iqbal and Khan, 11 N.E.3d 1, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (stating 
that the evaluator conducted the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory); In re Marriage of 
Gambla and Woodson, 853 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (discussing how specific parties 
completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”), the Adult–
Adolescent Parenting Inventory, and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-3 (“MCMI-3”)); In 
re Marriage of Johnson, 815 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the court-
appointed psychologist administered the MMPI–2 to the parents in the litigation); In re Marriage 
of Jaster, 583 N.E.2d 659, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing how the court-appointed evaluator 
administered the MMPI-2 to the parties and met with the family members on approximately eight 
days); In re Marriage of L.R. and A.L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that 
the psychologist’s recommendations were based, in part, on the results of the Millon Clincial 
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presents a problem because the most commonly used psychological 
tests in family-court settings are what are known as clinical assessment 
instruments (“CAIs”), which have been demonstrated to be unreliable, 
invalid, and irrelevant in the context of child-custody proceedings.7  
Evaluators base their conclusions on the results of these tests,8 and 
judges often fail to notice or concern themselves with the tests’ biases.9  
Judges tend to rely heavily on expert opinion, and therefore these 
evaluations and testimonies are often dispositive on the outcome of the 
custody decision.10  Consequently, judges’ custody decisions are often 
influenced by the results of faulty psychological testing.11 
Choosing whether or not to appoint an evaluator and deciding other 
custody disputes requires courts to use the “best interest of the child” 
standard, which requires courts to make decisions in accordance with 
the child’s best interest.12  Courts weigh many factors in ascertaining 
 
Multiaxial Inventory). 
7. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 48 (3d ed. 
2007); see Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that there is no reliable, custody-
specific psychological test currently available that is tailored for people in the middle of a custody 
battle, nor are there any reliable tests that measure parenting capacity). 
8. See David Brodzinksy, On the Use and Misuse of Psychological Testing in Child Custody 
Evaluations, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 213, 214 (1993) (“[P]sychologists routinely 
overstep the boundaries of their professional role by offering opinions about custody and 
visitation matters based to a great extent, and sometimes exclusively, on the results of 
psychological testing.”). 
9. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing how courts have given psychological tests such as the 
MMPI-2 unsophisticated attention and fail to question the validity of these tests). 
10. Robert M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Krauss, Introduction to SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CHILD 
CUSTODY DECISIONS 2–6 (Robert M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Krauss, eds., 1999); Dana R. 
Baerger et al., A Methodology for Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of Child Custody 
Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 35, 35 (2002); see James N. Bow & Francella A. 
Quinnell, A Critical Review of Child Custody Reports, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 165 (2002) (stating 
that the expert’s report is usually taken at face value in court and not subject to cross-
examination). 
11. Baerger et al., supra note 10, at 35.  The issue of admissibility of the evidence collected 
during the evaluation process and the recommendations that come from the evaluations are 
closely related to the problems that psychological tests pose in child-custody evaluations; 
however, this Comment is limited to the analyzing the problems that certain psychological tests 
pose rather than the issue of admissibility. 
12. See Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ill. 2011) (noting that section 603 of the 
IMDMA mandates that the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of 
the child and shall consider all relevant factors in doing so); People ex rel. Morris v. Morris, 254 
N.E.2d 478, 479 (Ill. 1969) (stating that the custody of a child should be awarded to any person 
only where such action is consistent with the welfare and best interests of the child); In re 
Marriage of Bhati and Singh, 920 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (discussing how a 
determination of the best interests of the child cannot be reduced to a bright-line test and must be 
made on a case-by-case basis); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) 
(“The trial court is directed to determine custody in accordance to the best interest of that 
child . . . [i]n custody cases the trial court is vested with great discretion because it has a better 
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what exactly is in the child’s best interest, including: (1) the likelihood 
that the proposed move will enhance the general quality of life for both 
the custodial parent and the children; (2) the motives of the custodial 
parent in seeking the move; (3) the motives of the noncustodial parent 
in resisting the removal; (4) the effect on the non-custodial parent’s 
visitation rights; and (5) whether a realistic and reasonable visitation 
schedule can be reached if removal is permitted.13  Section 604(b) of the 
IMDMA grants courts the discretion to appoint a child-custody 
evaluator, and its lack of guidelines for implementation, the use of 
faulty psychological testing in the evaluations, and judges’ heavy 
reliance on evaluators’ recommendations all cast doubt on whether the 
resulting custody decision is in the best interests of the child, and raise 
the question of whether there is a better way to ensure children’s best 
interests are truly protected.14 
This Comment provides background about the evolution of custody 
standards that eventually transformed into the “best interest of the 
child” standard, the statutory and common law “best interest of the 
child” standard in Illinois, the difference between forensic and 
therapeutic assessments, the different types of psychological 
instruments, the use of certain psychological tests and how they are 
administered, and the history of section 604(b) of the IMDMA.15  Part 
II discusses how the Illinois statute is enforced in practice as well as 
how other states approach using court-appointed evaluators in order to 
provide a context in which to place Illinois’ law.16  Part III analyzes the 
current state of the law in Illinois; the use of psychological tests by 
604(b) evaluators and their biases, unreliability, and flawed 
administration; and the direct effect these tests have on the outcome of 
 
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to determine the best interests of the child.”); In re 
Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“In reviewing orders bearing 
upon child custody, it is also the duty of this court to give constant and unswerving attention to 
the best interests of the child.”); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 
(1977) (“Under a petition for change of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child are of 
primary concern to the court.”). 
13. In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988); Winebright v. Winebright, 
508 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); In re Custody of Anderson, 496 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986); Gallagher v. Gallagher, 376 N.E.2d 279, 281–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
14. See generally Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4–15 (opining that child-custody 
evaluations do not serve the best interest of the child because of scientific concerns and arguing 
for the implementation of a better system). 
15. See infra Part I.A–F (providing context that will help understand why the use of CAIs are 
inappropriate in a child-custody litigation context). 
16. See infra Part II.A–C (discussing how Illinois courts apply the language of section 604(b) 
when appointment of evaluator is contested by a party). 
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the child-custody proceedings.17  Finally, Part IV discusses the need for 
statutory guidelines of section 604(b) regarding the scope of an 
evaluator’s evaluation, and ultimately proposes that the use of certain 
psychological tests in child-custody proceedings, namely CAIs, in 
custody proceedings should be abolished.18 
I. BACKGROUND 
The law governing child-custody evaluators is stated in section 
604(b) of the IMDMA, and its lack of comprehensiveness leaves room 
for courts to interpret its meaning and determine how it should be 
enforced.19  Section 604(b) states: 
The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or 
not employed by the court on a regular basis.  The advice shall be in 
writing and made available by the court to counsel.  Counsel may 
examine, as a witness, any professional personnel consulted by the 
court, designated as a court’s witness.  Professional personnel 
consulted by the court are subject to subpoena for the purposes of 
discovery, trial, or both.  The court shall allocate the costs and fees of 
those professional personnel between the parties based upon the 
financial ability of each party and any other criteria the court considers 
appropriate.  Upon the request of any party or upon the court’s own 
motion, the court may conduct a hearing as to the reasonableness of 
those fees and costs.20 
This Part begins by examining how child-custody standards have 
evolved over time.21  Next, this Part provides background about the 
“best interest of the child” standard in Illinois.22  This Part then 
examines the difference between therapeutic and forensic 
 
17. See infra Part III.A–C (analyzing the lack of guidelines that section 604(b) has, leaving 
Illinois courts to apply it on an ad hoc basis, as well as the outcome-determinative nature of 
flawed psychological testing used in child-custody litigation). 
18. See infra Part IV.A–B (proposing that Illinois should adopt a rule similar to that of 
California Rule of Court 5.225 and restrict psychological testing to tests that are meant to be used 
in the legal system, rather than psychological tests designed to be used in a clinical therapeutic 
setting). 
19. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/604(b) (2014). 
20. Id.; see In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) 
(stating that section 604(b) of the IMDMA provides a mechanism for the court to appoint an 
independent evaluator on custody and visitation issues, the purpose of the statute is to make the 
information available to assist the circuit court, and the expert witness is appointed to protect the 
interests of minor children regarding custody and visitation issues). 
21. See infra Part I.A (discussing the evolution of child-custody standards that eventually 
resulted in the “best interest of the child,” the prevailing standard today). 
22. See infra Part I.B (discussing how the standard is codified in Illinois law and how courts 
apply the standard). 
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assessments,23 and compares certain psychological instruments.24  Next, 
this Part provides background about the specifics of certain 
psychological tests and their typical administrations.25  Finally, this Part 
explores the legislative history of section 604(b), and how the statutory 
language came to be what it is today.26 
A.  Evolution of Child-Custody Standards 
In the early nineteenth century, English law resolved custody disputes 
by placing the child in custody with the father.27  Only one factual 
inquiry was made in these custody proceedings: whether one of the 
claimants was the biological father of the child and was married to the 
mother when the child was born.28  This rule derived from ancient 
Rome where the “paterfamilias” was in control of all domestic and 
public life.29  Children were seen as the property of their father, and this 
resulted in fathers having total control over their children.30  All the 
slaves, children, and grandchildren of everyone in the patriarch’s power 
legally belonged to him.31 
In colonial America, fathers were the economic head of the 
household and were awarded custody of children because of their 
economic importance.32  It was assumed that the father would be better 
 
23. See infra Part I.C (discussing how therapeutic assessment occurs in the context of a 
clinical setting, such as therapy, while forensic assessment occurs at the behest of the legal 
system). 
24. See infra Part I.D (discussing the difference between CAIs, forensic assessment 
instruments (“FAIs”), and forensically relevant instruments (“FRIs”)). 
25. See infra Part I.E (discussing the differences between the MMPI-2, MCMI, and Rorschach 
tests, and how they are typically administered). 
26. See infra Part I.F (discussing how the language of section 604(b) has developed over time, 
and whether any changes have been significant). 
27. Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975); see King v. DeManneville, 102 
Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (K.B. 1804) (stating that the father is entitled by law to the custody of his 
child). 
28. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234.  A husband’s cruelty, violence, or infidelity were not 
enough to justify granting custody to the wife, even if the father was in jail at the time.  See 
generally King v. Greenhill, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836); Ex parte Skinner, 27 Rev. R. 710 
(C.P. 1824). 
29. THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD 53 (1996); Steven N. Peskind, 
Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but 
Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2005). 
30. Peskind, supra note 29, at 452. 
31. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 53. 
32. Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends in 
Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q. 215, 
219 (1997); Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants: The American Colonial Model of Child 
Custody and Control, 2 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 317, 319 (1994); Peskind, supra note 29, at 
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able to supervise the children because he was in control of apprentices 
and other laborers in his home.33  This patriarchal preference began to 
erode in Revolutionary America.34  The American Revolution 
transformed the idea of the family into a collection of individuals, each 
with his or her own rights, as opposed to the earlier idea of a unit 
headed by the patriarch.35 
By the end of the eighteenth century, children were no longer seen as 
their fathers’ economic tools and the focus shifted into a consideration 
of children’s needs and an inquiry into which parent would be better 
able to provide for those needs.36  This shift in focus implicitly 
recognized the importance of separating the children’s needs from their 
parents’ needs.37 
Nineteenth-century American law continued to reject the idea of 
absolute paternal preference.38  In nineteenth-century America, the 
family still had a patriarch as its head, and the law still considered 
women and children to be inferior, but judges increasingly began to 
intervene in family matters in order to protect individual family 
members’ interests.39  Many jurisdictions were authorized to grant 
custody to either the husband or wife in a custody proceeding.40  
Despite some statutes expressing a preference for paternal custody, a 
fault-based rule eventually emerged: “The children will be best taken 
care of and instructed by the innocent party.”41 
 
452; see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1154 
(stating that the common-law doctrine gave virtually absolute custody of any child to the father). 
33. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452; Teitelbaum, supra 
note 32, at 1154. 
34. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452. 
35. Peskind, supra note 29, at 452; see MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54 (commenting that the 
American Revolution, with its “fierce opposition to patriarchy,” began a transformation: the 
family became a collectivity of individuals with their own rights and interests as opposed to an 
“organic whole with the patriarch as its head”). 
36. Peskind, supra note 29, at 454. 
37. Id. 
38. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234; Peskind, supra note 29, at 452.  During the course of the 
nineteenth century, the judiciary began to re-balance spouses’ rights in determining custody.  See 
generally Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, 
Adoption, and the Courts 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979) (examining the evolution 
of American family law from 1796 through 1851). 
39. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 54. 
40. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234.  Many earlier cases demonstrate that the mother as well 
as the father could claim custody of the children.  See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433, 446 
(1867); Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639 (N.Y. 1846). 
41. J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 518, 520 (1852); 
Mnookin, supra note 27, at 234; Bernadette Weaver-Catalana, Comment, The Battle for Baby 
Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 583, 613 (1995).  See generally A. LLOYD, 
LAW OF DIVORCE 40–145 (1887) (discussing how courts were authorized to grant custody to 
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During the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the 
wife typically filed for divorce, and she was required to prove that her 
husband was at fault in order to prevail in a custody proceeding.42  
Given this social convention, courts began to award custody to the 
mother more often than the father.43 
Gradually during the twentieth century, the law evolved into favoring 
a maternal preference for child custody.44  During this period, women 
began to obtain more social and economic power, their education levels 
increased, and society began to view women as having “maternal 
instincts” which were thought to make them better suited to care for 
children than men.45  The courts began to interpret this movement as 
giving the mother a substantial preference, especially if the children 
involved were young.46  This maternal preference rule, also known as 
the “tender years doctrine,” became incorporated into statutes and 
common law.47  The law began to view women as having better morals 
and being better able to nurture and raise children than men.48  This 
 
either the mother or father). 
42. Peskind, supra note 29, at 453–54. 
43. Id.; Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235. 
44. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Andre P. 
Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspectives, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1369, 
1370–71 (1976) (noting that the presumption for custodial maternal preference corresponded with 
the rise in women’s rights and changes in how society perceived children’s needs). 
45. Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220. 
As a general rule a father is entitled to the custody of his minor children; but when the 
parents live apart under a voluntary separation, and the father has left an infant child in 
the custody of its mother, such custody will not be transferred to the father . . . when 
the infant is of tender age, and of a delicate and sickly habit, peculiarly requiring a 
mother’s care and attention; and especially will not an order for such transfer be made 
where the qualifications of the father for the proper discharge of the parental office are 
not equal to those of the mother. 
Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 64 (N.Y. 1840). 
46. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Ullman v. Ullman, 
135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1926) (stating that a child at tender age is entitled to have the care, love 
and discipline that only a good and devoted mother can usually give). 
47. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 235; Peskind, supra note 29, at 454; see Miner v. Miner 11 Ill. 
43, 50 (1849) (affirming an order giving custody of a seven-year-old girl to her mother over the 
objection of the father, and basing its holding on the “tender care which nature requires, and 
which it is the peculiar province of a mother to supply”); People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 91 
App. Div. 322, 325 (N.Y. 1904) (stating that courts do not hesitate to award custody of young 
infants to the wife “as against the paramount right of the husband where the wife has shown 
herself to be the proper person”); Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 219 (stating that the relevant 
factors for determining the best interests of the child included the desires of the parents, the 
wishes of the child, the child’s needs, any special mental or physical conditions, the child’s sex 
and age, parental fitness, the moral fortitude of the parents, and a presumption in favor of the 
mother if the children were young). 
48. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220; see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S 
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 49–84 (1994) (stating that this “cult of motherhood” focused 
NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:44 PM 
874 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  46 
maternal presumption of child custody remained intact for the first sixty 
years of the twentieth century.49 
In the mid-twentieth century, the rules affecting child custody 
transformed.50  Society’s attitudes toward children and families changed 
as a result of the feminist movement and the increasing presence of the 
federal government in family law matters.51  Feminism promoted 
theories of equal rights between men and women, and this contributed 
largely to the obviation of the maternal custodial preference.52  
Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s divorce rates were rising, women’s 
traditional roles were challenged, and men began claiming sex 
discrimination in custody awards.53  As a result of this turmoil, most 
states abandoned the maternal preference for custody and sought a more 
gender-neutral standard.54  State legislatures drafted statutes for judges 
to apply the “best interest of the child” standard, and this standard 
became the new gender-neutral standard for courts to apply in child-
custody proceedings.55 
 
on the superior nurturing and moral qualities of women that better suited them for raising 
children, as opposed to men, and the welfare of the child was no longer clearly served best by the 
father). 
49. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220. 
50. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States 
1950–2000, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 3, 4 
(Sanford N. Katz et al., eds., 2000); Peskind, supra note 29, at 455. 
51. Grossberg, supra note 50, at 4. 
52. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455.  The irony is that feminism promoted theories of equal 
rights between men and women, but this led to getting rid of a presumption that favored women.  
Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220. 
53. Grossberg, supra note 50, at 8. 
54. Id.; Arlene Skolnick, Solomon’s Children: The New Biologism, Psychological 
Parenthood, Attachment Theory, and the Best Interest Standard, in ALL OUR FAMILIES, NEW 
POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 242–43 (Mary Ann Mason et al., eds., 1998); see Mason & 
Quirk, supra note 32, at 220 (stating that the presumption that the interests of a child during his or 
her “tender years” is best served by maternal custody was legally abolished and demoted to a 
“factor to be considered” in nearly all states between 1960 and 1990).  By 1982, the only 
remaining states that gave mothers a custodial preference over fathers during the child’s tender 
years were Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Utah, and Virginia.  Jeff 
Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 
11 (1984). 
55. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 220–21.  The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
defined the child’s best interests as taking into account the following factors: 
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the 
child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his 
parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the 
child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; 
and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).  The Act further notes that 
“[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his 
relationship to the child.”  Id. 
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B.  The Best Interest of the Child Standard in Illinois 
The “best interest of the child” standard is codified in section 602 of 
the IMDMA, and it delineates all relevant factors that the court must 
consider in determining custody based on the best interests of the child, 
including: 
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the 
wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and 
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings 
and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best 
interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and 
community; (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved; (6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by 
the child’s potential custodian, whether directed against the child or 
directed against another person; (7) the occurrence of ongoing or 
repeated abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic 
Violence Act of 1986, whether directed against the child or directed 
against another person; (8) the willingness and ability of each parent 
to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between 
the other parent and the child; [and] (9) whether one of the parents is a 
sex offender[.]”56 
The “best interest of the child” standard does not support any legal 
presumptions that favor a particular sex, but rather aims to resolve 
custody disputes in a gender-neutral manner.57  A court must consider 
many different factors and circumstances in order to ensure that the 
children’s welfare and best interests are protected.58  Inherent in 
applying this standard is the requirement that courts predict future 
conditions that may affect a child’s welfare.59  Resolving a custody 
dispute by applying this standard involves evaluating the attitudes, 
dispositions, capacities, and shortcomings of each parent, and the 
 
56. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2014). 
57. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455.  In attempts to come to a more gender-neutral standard, 
many legislatures suggested joint custody, which gave men and women equal rights, or a primary 
caretaker preference, which quantified time spent with the child in order to decide who obtains 
custody.  Despite these efforts, most states maintained the best interest standard.  Mason & Quirk, 
supra note 32, at 221. 
58. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455; see In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979) (stating that each situation is different and the general principles exist for the trial 
and reviewing court to reach a decision designed to protect children’s best interests). 
59. Peskind, supra note 29, at 460. 
Adjudication usually requires the determination of past acts and facts, not a prediction 
of future events.  Applying the best-interests standard requires an individualized 
prediction: with whom will this child be better off in the years to come?  Proof of what 
happened in the past is relevant only insofar as it enables the court to decide what is 
likely to happen in the future. 
Mnookin, supra note 27, at 251. 
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inquiry focuses on the kind of person each parent is and what the child 
is like.60 
Despite this seemingly commendable nature of the standard’s goals 
and objectives, courts have faced many challenges in applying it.61  
Nonetheless, “best interest of the child” remains the favored standard 
for child-custody proceedings.62 
C.  Therapeutic v. Forensic Assessment 
Section 604(b) of the IMDMA gives the court the discretion to 
appoint an evaluator to help the court come to a conclusion regarding 
custody.63  When a court appoints an evaluator in child-custody 
proceedings, the evaluators are often psychologists or other mental-
health experts who provide evaluations in order to ascertain what, in 
fact, is the best interest of the child.64  As part of their evaluations, these 
evaluators often conduct psychological tests to assess the parents, 
guardians, and children.65 
In order to understand why using psychological examinations in 
child-custody proceedings is problematic, it is important to understand 
the distinction between therapeutic assessments, which occur at the 
request and on behalf of the patient in a clinical setting,66 and forensic 
 
60. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 251. 
61. Peskind, supra note 29, at 455.  The best interest standard applies uniquely in each 
situation because each individual child and family is unique.  See Mnookin, supra note 27, at 227 
(“Custody law today reflects a complicated and chaotic multiplicity of such factors as the 
doctrinal thread invoked, the identity of the disputants, their prior relationship to the child, and 
the setting from which the dispute arose.”). 
62. Mason & Quirk, supra note 32, at 221; see In re Marriage of Turk, 12 N.E.3d 40, 45 (Ill. 
2014) (stating that a range of considerations may affect the court’s assessment of custody with the 
ultimate objective of serving the best interest of the child). 
63. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (2014). 
64. Steven K. Erickson et al., A Critical Examination of the Suitability and Limitations of 
Psychological Tests in Family Court, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 157, 158 (2007); see Daniel W. Shuman, 
What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say about the “Best Interests of the 
Child”? An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 
565–66 (1997) (stating that the best interests standard assumes that mental-health professionals 
have a sound basis for determining the best child-custody arrangements and impliedly, that 
lawyers and judges do not). 
65. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 157; see Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health 
Experts in Custody Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. 
L.Q. 135, 142 (2002) (opining that given the risk of error associated with unstructured clinical 
decision-making, it is not surprising that mental-health professionals conducting custody 
evaluations have resorted to using psychological tests); see also Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. 
Ackerman, Child Custody Evaluation Practices: A 1996 Survey of Psychologists, 30 FAM. L.Q. 
565, 573 (1996) (stating that when a child-custody evaluation is conducted by a psychologist, the 
MMPI-2 is often used as part of the evaluation process). 
66. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 43. 
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assessments, which occur at the behest of the legal system.67  These two 
types of assessments differ in a number of aspects, particularly the 
identity of the client, the focus and scope of the examination, the 
response style and involvement of the client, and the pace of the 
evaluation.68  Assessment in a child-custody proceeding is always a 
forensic evaluation, because the goal is not to diagnose or treat the 
examinee, but rather to answer legal questions and analyze the effect the 
evaluation should have on the litigation.69 
Therapeutic assessments occur at the request and on behalf of a 
patient as a function of a clinical environment, such as a personality test 
administered in a therapy session.70  In this type of setting, evaluators 
discuss with their patients broad issues such as diagnosis, personality 
functioning, and treatment to change behavior.71  The treating clinician 
is focused on understanding the client’s subjective point of view of the 
issue or situation,72 and the client typically is voluntarily seeking an 
assessment rather than at the request of a third party.73  Clients have 
great autonomy and input regarding the objectives and procedures of 
their assessment, and the therapist and client seek to develop a common 
agenda based on the client’s needs.74  Therapeutic assessment 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 44; see Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2011) (finding that the 604(b) report 
was not privileged under the Confidentiality Act because the parties were interviewed in the 
context of child-custody proceedings, not a therapeutic setting where they were receiving mental-
health services).  See generally Stuart Greenberg & Daniel Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict 
Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 50, 54 (1997) 
(comprehensively discussing the ten major differences between therapeutic and forensic 
relationships). 
69. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 45 (discussing that the most obvious difference 
between a forensic and therapeutic evaluation is that the focus of forensic evaluations is dictated 
by a legal system that is only occasionally interested in information about treatment); Kirk 
Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation: Critically Assessing Mental Health Experts and 
Psychological Tests, 29 FAM. L.Q. 63, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Heilbrun, Child Custody 
Evaluation] (stating that when a mental-health professional is asked by a judge to perform an 
evaluation for the purpose of a legal proceeding, the mental-health professional assumes a 
forensic role in that case). 
70. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 43; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 
(stating that the therapist is answerable to the client, who decides whether or not to uses the 
therapist’s services). 
71. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44. 
72. Id. at 45.  This is because the goal of therapeutic assessment is to diagnose issues and 
provide treatment, which varies from person to person. 
73. Id. at 44.  Therapeutic assessment is obviously not voluntary in the case of someone being 
forced to go to court-ordered therapy, but in the majority of circumstances, individuals seek 
therapy because they are looking to improve some aspect of their mental health and want to seek 
help. 
74. Id.; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that the therapist is usually 
supportive, accepting, and empathic). 
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emphasizes caring, trust, and empathic understanding,75 and the 
evaluations typically proceed at a leisurely pace.76 
In contrast, forensic evaluations address narrowly defined, non-
clinical events, and evaluators minimally address clinical issues such as 
treatment or diagnosis.77  In a forensic examination setting, the forensic 
examiner is concerned with assisting a third party—such as an attorney, 
court, or employer—by providing these parties with information about 
the examinee that it might not otherwise have.78  People undergoing a 
forensic evaluation in the context of a legal issue almost always do so at 
the request of a third party such as a judge or attorney.79  Statutes or 
common-law tests that are relevant to the legal issue rather than the 
examinee, determine the objectives in forensic evaluations.80  The threat 
of conscious and intentional distortion of information is substantially 
greater in the forensic, rather than therapeutic, context.81  A forensic 
evaluator is more likely than a therapist to be confronted with resistant 
and uncooperative individuals; therefore, the coerced nature of the 
evaluation process and the importance of its outcome threatens the 
validity by way of possible misrepresentation.82  Further, the forensic 
examiners may not communicate to their examinees the idea that they 
are playing a “helping” role.83  There is greater emotional distance 
between the forensic clinician and the client, and factors such as court 
schedules and limited resources limit opportunities for contact between 
them.84  A forensic evaluation should address the threshold issues, 
 
75. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44.  See generally Nicholas Hobbs, Sources of Gain in 
Psychotherapy, 17 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1962) (noting that empathic understanding by the 
therapist is one general source of gain in therapy). 
76. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44.  In therapeutic contexts, diagnoses may be 
reconsidered during the course of treatment and revised after the initial interviews are conducted. 
77. Id. at 44; see id. at 45 (“It is neither proper nor necessary to subvert the forensic 
assessment process with a misplaced emphasis on diagnostic and treatment concerns.”). 
78. Id. at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that the forensic 
evaluator is ultimately answerable to the attorney or court in the case of a court-appointed expert, 
who decides whether to use the evaluator’s services). 
79. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 55 
(stating that in the context of a forensic evaluation, the court or attorney retains the forensic 
evaluator for litigation). 
80. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 55 
(stating that the forensic evaluator must know the law as it relates to the assessment of the 
particular impairment claimed). 
81. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 46. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 44; see Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68, at 54 (stating that forensic evaluators 
are usually neutral and objective, and their task is to remain dispassionate as to the psycholegal 
issues being evaluated). 
84. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 44; Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
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which are typically a description of relevant mental functioning, the 
relevant legal capacity, and the relationship between the two.85 
D.  Psychological Instruments 
Testing has become a significant aspect of forensic evaluation for 
many reasons, especially because it offers a scientific dimension and 
objectivity to opinions, which lawyers and judges favor.86  
Psychological testing instruments can be broken into three categories: 
CAIs, forensically relevant instruments (“FRIs”), and forensic 
assessment instruments (“FAIs”).87  The most common psychological 
instruments are CAIs.88  These are psychological tests that were initially 
developed for use in assessment, diagnosis, and treatment planning in 
the context of therapy.89  CAIs are the least likely of the three types of 
psychological instruments to be of direct help in forensic evaluations, 
because they assess general psychological constructs such as 
depression, intelligence, and anxiety that are too far removed from the 
issues courts consider in custody disputes.90 
FRIs assess clinical constructs that are most relevant to the evaluation 
of people involved in the legal system, such as psychopathy and 
violence risk.91  They are less frequently used by mental-health 
professionals and tend to be less thoroughly researched.92 
FAIs are specifically designed to be used in the legal system and to 
assess “psycholegal” capacities such as competence to stand trial or the 
ability to handle certain legal matters, such as an estate.93  In the case of 
 
85. Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 67. 
86. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 47; David Brodzinsky, On the Use and Misuse of 
Psychological Testing in Child Custody Evaluations, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 213, 216 
(1993). 
87. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 47–48.  See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING 
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 31–53 (2d ed. 1986) (introducing 
the concept of FAIs). 
88. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48.  This should not be surprising considering therapeutic 
assessments are more common than forensic assessments, and CAIs are used in therapeutic 
assessments to measure clinical constructs such as personality and depression. 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  But cf. FORENSIC USES OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS (Robert P. Archer 
ed., 1st ed. 2006) (providing a basis to understand the appropriate uses and limitations of CAIs in 
forensic contexts). 
91. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48. 
92. See id. (stating that FRIs that are proven valid provide a good balance between clinical 
confidence and legal relevance). 
93. Id.; see GRISSO, supra note 87, at 34 (“A forensic assessment instrument is an operational 
definition of a legally relevant functional ability concept.  Therefore, FAIs are intended to provide 
data that can manage the conceptual gap between legal constructs and psychological 
constructs.”); Kirk Heilbrun, The Role of Psychological Testing in Forensic Assessment, 16 LAW 
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child custody, the legal competency in question is parental competency, 
or which parental situation represents the best prospects for the child’s 
best interests.94  The development of FAIs suggests that mental-health 
professionals are aware that CAIs have limited relevance in forensic 
contexts.95 
FAIs offer several benefits for forensic assessments.96  They provide 
the examiner with structure and make clear what it is that the law wants 
to know about human capacities, because these capacities are part of the 
FAI structure.97  They can help the examiner in logically arriving at data 
and inferences that are consistent with the purpose of forensic 
assessments: to make legally relevant assessments for legal 
competencies—such as parental competency.98  Further, FAI data that 
are valid on their face in relation to the legal competency construct 
would require a smaller inferential leap than when an expert attempts to 
relate psychiatric symptoms or personality traits99 to the legal 
competency construct at issue in the litigation.100 
E.  Psychological Tests and How They Are Administered 
Before discussing commonly used psychological tests in child- 
custody proceedings, it is necessary to understand certain psychological 
terms, namely validity, reliability, and relevance.  The concepts of 
validity and reliability are two fundamental psychometric properties of 
psychological tests that describe the scientific characteristics of a test.101  
The validity of a test is the degree to which it measures what it purports 
 
& HUM. BEHAV. 257, 257 (1992) [hereinafter Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing] (stating in 
a footnote that forensic assessment refers to information produced by mental-health experts 
intended for application to legal issues). 
94. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 6. 
95. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48; see GRISSO, supra note 87, at 31 (discussing how the 
use of these CAIs will not satisfy courts’ needs for relevant and credible information about the 
examinee’s functional abilities related to the relevant legal competency at issue). 
96. Id. at 35.  But see id. at 38 (discussing the potential for misuse and misinterpretation of 
FAIs and the need to approach them with caution and scrutiny). 
97. Id. 
98. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 52 (stating that some FAIs are described as 
interview guides that provide a list of topics to help clinicians structure their interviews around 
appropriate legal issues). 
99. Psychiatric symptoms or general personality traits are assessed by CAI, which require an 
expert or evaluator to make an inference as to what the specific symptom or trait says about the 
legal competency construct at issue. 
100. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 35; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 53 (stating that when 
FAIs are used, the chain of inferences from test behavior to legal criterion is typically reduced). 
101. David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations Following 
Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199, 200 (2003). 
NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:44 PM 
2015] Mixing Oil & Water 881 
to measure.102  It describes the accuracy of a test and the degree to 
which it provides a true measurement of whatever is being assessed.103  
Another way of thinking about validity is by posing the question: “Are 
we measuring what we think we are measuring?”104  Reliability relates 
to the consistency or stability of the test results.105  It provides 
information about whether a test provides similar results after it is 
repeated over time or across situations.106 
A test must be scientifically reliable to be scientifically valid; 
however, a test does not have to be scientifically valid to be 
scientifically reliable.107  Both reliability and validity are vital in 
assessing whether or not a test is accurate, and they relate to each other 
because they provide meaningful insight about the truthfulness and 
consistency of the test results.108  Reliability is a part of what makes a 
test valid, because if a test cannot consistently yield the same results, 
then it is unlikely that the test is conveying useful information.109  
While the two concepts are related, it is possible for a test to have a high 
level of reliability and a low level of validity, and vice versa.110  For 
example, a test could yield the same results each time it is repeated, thus 
having a high level of reliability, but it could be a completely inaccurate 
way of measuring what is trying to be measured, thus having a low level 
of validity.111 
Not all tests are valid for measuring aspects of emotion, cognition, or 
 
102. Id.; Saul McLeod, What is Validity?, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY (2013), http://www.simply 
psychology.org/validity.html. 
103. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; McLeod, supra note 102. 
104. Dana R. Baerger et al., A Methodology for Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of 
Child Custody Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 35, 47 (2002). 
105. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; Saul McLeod, What is Reliability?, SIMPLY 
PSYCHOLOGY (2013), http://www.simplypsychology.org/reliability.html. 
106. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200; see McLeod, supra note 105 (stating that if research 
findings yield consistent results, they are reliable). 
107. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47.  A common-sense example of the relationship 
between validity and reliability is the traditional accuracy v. precision analogy in target practice.  
You can be precise but not accurate (every arrow hits the same spot, but that spot is off to the side 
of the bull’s-eye), accurate but not precise (you always hit around the bull’s-eye, but never the 
same spot twice), or both accurate and precise (all bull’s-eyes). 
108. Medoff, supra note 101, at 200–01. 
109. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47. 
110. Medoff, supra note 101, at 201; see Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 
93, at 265 (stating that the lower the reliability of a given test, the lower the limit on the validity 
of the construct being measured, and it should come as no surprise that tests with reliability 
coefficients below .80 have been criticized for containing excessive error variance and thus, 
poorer validity). 
111. Medoff, supra note 101, at 201.  In this situation, even though there is a high level of 
reliability, the test is not accurate because it has a low level of validity.  A test is meaningless if it 
yields the same results each time but the test is not measuring what it is supposed to measure. 
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personality functioning.112  Relevance refers to the extent to which a 
test is valid for the purpose for which it is used.113  A psychological test 
can be both reliable and valid, but it can also lack relevance if used in 
an inappropriate context.114  In deciding whether to administer a test in 
either a therapeutic or forensic context, the primary factor considered 
should be the degree to which the results will inform the decision that 
has to be made in the specific instance.115  Therefore, forensic 
examiners should be most concerned with the scientific research that 
links certain test results to relevant legal outcomes.116  If thorough 
research shows a relationship between the results of a certain test and a 
construct that is related to legally relevant behaviors, then 
administration of that test may be warranted.117  However, if a test only 
provides information about diagnosis or a general level of functioning 
and does not speak to legally relevant conclusions, then speculating 
about legally relevant behavior is not warranted and the clinician should 
inquire about a more direct way of addressing the issue.118 
1.  Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) is 
the most widely used objective personality inventory in the world,119 as 
well as the most frequently used objective adult personality test in 
family court evaluations.120  It was originally developed to screen for 
 
112. Id. 
113. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47. 
Psychological tests may simply be irrelevant when clinicians attempt to use them in a 
straightforward fashion to measure legal concepts.  The translation between the results 
of a test developed to measure a psychological construct such as “impulsivity” or 
“depression,” and the outcome on a legal dimension such as “ability to assist counsel in 
one’s own defense,” must be justified by the relevance of that psychological construct 
to the legal construct. 
Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 265 (internal citations omitted). 
114. See Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 47 (“A psychological test can be reliable and valid, 
and still lack relevance in the context of a [child-custody evaluation] because it is not valid for the 
purpose of determining parenting capacity.”). 
115. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 50. 
116. Id.; Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 265. 
117. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 50. 
118. Id. 
119. ALAN F. FRIEDMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT WITH THE MMPI-2, at 1 
(2001).  The widespread use of the MMPI-2 is attributable to many factors including its simplicity 
of scoring and administration, an objective response format important for research designs, a 
large item pool, many useful applications, and thousands of empirically established correlates. 
120. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 13; Shuman, supra note 65, at 144; see Michaela 
C. Heinze & Thomas Grisso, Review of Instruments Assessing Parenting Competencies Used in 
Child Custody Evaluations, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 293, 294–95 (1996) (explaining how the most 
frequently used test to identify parenting capacity was the Ackerman-Schoendorf Scales for 
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severe psychopathology like depression, paranoia, and schizophrenia.121  
A 1986 national survey reported that about seventy percent of custody 
evaluators used the MMPI in their custody evaluations,122 and a 1997 
national survey reported that ninety-two percent of clinicians used the 
MMPI in their evaluations.123  A 2005 national study analyzing the 
administration, scoring, and interpretation of the MMPI-2 in child-
custody evaluations found that ninety-eight percent of child-custody 
evaluators used the MMPI-2 in their evaluations.124 
The MMPI-2 is designed to make it difficult for people to fake their 
answers, deny their problems, or give a particular impression.125  The 
test is based on empirical research rather than a clinician’s assumptions 
on what certain answers reveal about a particular personality trait.126  
The test is a self-report measure of the test-taker’s psychological state 
that entails 567 true-or-false items.127 
The MMPI-2 has ten main clinical scales and three main validity 
scales.128  Eight of the clinical scales address psychopathology such as 
depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder, while two of the 
clinical scales address personality traits such as anger and 
hypochondriasis.129  The three validity scales are designed to assess 
whether the subject’s responses are an accurate representation of the 
 
Parent Evaluation of Custody (“ASPECT”), which includes having parents complete the MMPI-2 
in addition to several other assessment steps). 
121. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145; see infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing why using a test 
originally designed to screen for such psychopathologies is a problem in the context of measuring 
the “best interest of the child”). 
122. William G. Keilin & Larry J. Bloom, Child Custody Evaluation Practices: A Survey of 
Experienced Professionals, 17 PROF. PSYCHOL. RESP. & PRACT. 338, 341 tbl.3 (1986); Joseph T. 
McCann et al., The MCMI-III in Child Custody Evaluations: A Normative Study, 1 J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHOL. PRAC. 27, 29 (2001). 
123. Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practices: A Survey of 
Experienced Professionals (Revisited), 28 PROF. PSYCHOL. RESP. & PRACT. 137, 140 (1997); 
McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29. 
124. James N. Bow et al., An Analysis of Administration, Scoring, and Interpretation of the 
MMPI-2 and MCMI-II/II in Child Custody Evaluations, 2 J. CHILD. CUSTODY 1, 8 (2005). 
125. Mike Drayton, The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), 59 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 135, 135 (2009). 
126. Id. 
127. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48 (stating that the MMPI-2 consists of 
objectively scored items and produce protocols that have been related to global symptom patterns, 
likely diagnoses, and characteristics of general personality functioning and behavior). 
128. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145; see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 2–3 (the three 
validity scales include: Lie (L), Infrequency (F), and Correction (K).  The ten clinical scales 
include: Hypochondriasis (Hs), Depression (D), Hysteria (Hy), Psychopathic Deviate (Pd), 
Masculinity–Femininity (Mf), Paranoia (Pa), Psychasthenia (Pt), Schizophrenia (Sc), Hypomania 
(Ma), and Social Introversion (Si)). 
129. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145. 
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psychopathology being tested and the subject’s approach to the 
testing.130 
However, the MMPI-2 is not intended for use with adolescents.131  
The MMPI-2 committee recognized that adult norms would not apply to 
an adolescent form, and a separate revision of the test was conducted for 
the sole purpose of developing an adolescent instrument derived from 
the MMPI-2.132  This revision was named the MMPI-A (Adolescent).133 
2.  Rorschach Inkblot Technique 
The Rorschach Inkblot Technique (“Rorschach”) is the second most 
frequently used test in child-custody evaluations and the most 
frequently used projective test (as opposed to “objective” in the case of 
the MMPI) in child-custody evaluations.134  The test consists of ten 
ambiguous inkblot drawings that are individually shown to a test 
subject, who is then asked to explain or describe what he or she sees.135  
The test administrator then records the responses and asks follow-up 
questions.136 
The theory behind projective tests is that test subjects will 
unknowingly project aspects of their emotional lives, involving 
unconscious material, in an unstructured test.137  How a subject 
constructs the stimulus is assumed to project the subject’s psychological 
functioning and personality.138 
3.  Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory 
The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (“MCMI”) is the second 
 
130. Erickson, supra note 64, at 161; see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3 (stating that 
the validity scales were developed in order to assist in recognizing test records produced by 
uncooperative or deceptive participants with various test-taking attitudes or participants who had 
a difficult time understanding or reading the test items). 
131. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 9. 
132. Id.; R. P. Archer, Use of the MMPI with Adolescents: A Review of Salient Issues, 4 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 241, 241–51 (1984). 
133. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 9.  The MMPI-A was released in 1992 and is 
intended for adolescents between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, although if an individual 
possesses the necessary reading level and comprehension abilities but less than fourteen years 
old, it can still be used on that individual.  Because the adolescent norms include eighteen-year-
olds, a clinician who is testing an eighteen-year-old could use either the MMPI-A or the MMPI-2. 
134. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559; Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 123, at 140; 
Keilin & Bloom, supra note 122, at 341 tbl. 3. 
135. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148. 
136. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148. 
137. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 49 (“By ‘projecting’ their own perceptions and 
interpretations onto these ambiguous stimuli, clients reveal something about the ways in which 
they view and comprehend their environment.”). 
138. MELTON ET AL. supra note 7, at 49; Shuman, supra note 65, at 148. 
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most frequently used objective personality test in child-custody 
litigation.139  While a 1997 national study found that only about thirty-
four percent of child-custody evaluators utilized the MCMI with 
adults,140 a 2005 national study found that the use of the MCMI by 
child-custody evaluators in their evaluations increased to sixty-three 
percent.141  The test was designed for use with individuals who 
evidence problematic emotional and interpersonal symptoms, who are 
undergoing professional psychotherapy, or who are undergoing a 
psychodiagnostic evaluation.142 
The MCMI is a paper-and-pencil test that consists of 175 true-or-
false items that assess personality disorders based on Theodore Millon’s 
theory of personality and psychopathology.143  It provides a measure of 
twenty-four personality disorders and clinical syndromes for adults 
undergoing psychological assessment or treatment and assists clinicians 
in diagnosing psychiatric conditions and developing treatments that take 
into account the subject’s personality style and coping behavior.144  The 
test is often given in a clinical setting when questions arise over a 
specific diagnosis or personality characteristics that are affecting the 
patient’s ability to cope with his or her life.145 
F.  History of Section 604(b) 
In 1977, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the IMDMA,146 
which borrowed from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.147  The 
 
139. Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 123, at 140; Shuman, supra note 65, at 146. 
140. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29. 
141. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 12. 
142. Jane Framingham, Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III), PSYCH CENTRAL, 
http://psychcentral.com/lib/millon-clinical-multiaxial-inventory-mcmi-iii/0006106 (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2015). 
143. Shuman, supra note 65, at 146.  See generally THEODORE MILLON, CLINICAL MANUAL 
FOR THE MCMI-II (1987); James N. Bow et al., MMPI-2 and MCMI-III in Forensic Evaluations: 
A Survey of Psychologists, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 37, 38 (2010) (stating that unlike the 
MMPI-2, the MMCI is a criterion-referenced test and does not assume a normal curve of traits or 
disorders and that the MCMI’s items correspond closely with criteria from the fourth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). 
144. Framingham, supra note 142; see Bow et al., supra note 143, at 39 (stating that unlike 
the MMPI-2, the MMCI is a criterion-referenced test and does not assume a normal curve of traits 
or disorders). 
145. Framingham, supra note 142. 
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101–802 (1977). 
147. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was an attempt by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to make marriage and divorce laws more uniform and has 
had a huge impact on marriage and divorce laws in all states.  Marriage and Divorce Act, Model 
Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Marriage 
%20and%20Divorce%20Act,%20Model (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
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custody provisions of the IMDMA codified Illinois custody law and set 
the statutory standards for multiple facets of child-custody proceedings 
in divorce cases.148 
Section 604 of the IMDMA derives from section 404 of the Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, which states in a comment: “This section . . . 
[is] designed to permit the court to make custodial and visitation 
decisions as informally and non-contentiously as possible, based on as 
much relevant information as can be secured, while preserving a fair 
hearing for all interested parties.”149  From 1992 to 2011, section 604(b) 
stated: 
The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or 
not employed by the court on a regular basis.  The advice given shall 
be in writing and made available by the court to counsel.  Counsel 
may examine, as a witness, any professional personnel consulted by 
the court, designated as a court’s witness.150 
Yet, in 2011, the statute was amended to add the following language: 
Professional personnel consulted by the court are subject to subpoena 
for the purposes of discovery, trial, or both.  The court shall allocate 
the costs and fees of those professional personnel between the parties 
based upon the financial ability of each party and any other criteria the 
court considers appropriate.  Upon the request of any party or upon the 
court’s own motion, the court may conduct a hearing as to the 
reasonableness of those fees and costs.151 
This amendment essentially added a provision addressing how the 
costs and fees should be allocated and did nothing to affect the relevant 
part of section 604(b).  The 2011 amendment remains in place today, 
and section 604(b) as a whole remains functionally the same.152 
II. DISCUSSION 
This Part discusses how section 604(b) has been enforced in Illinois 
courts, and how other states have crafted their related statutes.153  
Comparing Illinois to California and Pennsylvania illustrates how 
different states address the child-custody evaluation process, and 
provides a scale with California being the most comprehensive, 
Pennsylvania being less comprehensive, and Illinois being the least 
 
148. John H. Doll, The Child Custody Provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 672 (1980). 
149. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 404, 9A U.L.A. 381, cmt. (1998). 
150. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (2010). 
151. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (2011). 
152. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604 (West 2014). 
153. See infra Part II.A–C (discussing the enforcement of section 604(b) and California’s 
codification of an evidentiary rule governing disputed child-custody suits). 
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comprehensive.154 
A.  The Current State of the Law: Enforcement of Section 604(b) 
In practice, Illinois courts may or may not decide to appoint an 
evaluator, and if they choose to do so, they may or may not decide to 
follow the evaluator’s recommendations, because section 604(b) uses 
extremely vague language and provides virtually no guidance as to how 
courts should apply it.155  When a court appoints a 604(b) evaluator and 
a party to the litigation opposes the evaluator’s testimony or evaluation, 
the court tends to resolve the issue in most cases by acknowledging its 
discretion in being able to appoint an evaluator and choose whether or 
not to follow the evaluator’s recommendations, and denying any 
objections the party claims.156  The lack of statutory guidance leaves 
much room for courts to reject a party’s argument that the court erred in 
either accepting or rejecting an evaluator’s recommendation, or 
appointing an evaluator at all.157  The statute gives courts the option to 
 
154. Id. 
155. The majority of cases deal with issues about a party opposing the appointment of an 
evaluator, or failing to adopt or not adopt the recommendation, rather than a party arguing that the 
court erred in failing to appoint an evaluator. 
156. See generally Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2011) (finding that the 604(b) report 
may only be disclosed to the court, counsel, and parties in the particular proceeding after the wife 
alleged violations by disseminating the information obtained by the 604(b) evaluator); In re 
Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d 1007, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding that 604(b) allows a 
trial court to seek advice in making a custody determination and denying the court the ability to 
consider the advice contained in the evaluator’s report would make no sense when an opposing 
party argued that the report should not be admitted into evidence); In re Marriage of Debra N. & 
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding that the court has the discretion to go 
against the recommendation of the evaluator when the opposing party argues that the court’s 
order was not consistent with the evaluator’s recommendation); In re Marriage of Bhati and 
Singh, 920 N.E.2d 1147, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding that section 604(b) refers to the advice 
of professional personnel, and does not refer to or intend to include “expert” opinions when an 
opposing party argues that the psychiatrist should not have been permitted to testify because she 
was not an expert); In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (noting 
that the policy of section 604(b) is to provide the court with as much relevant evidence as can be 
secured concerning the best interests of the child and finding that there was no error in the trial 
court’s acceptance of the psychologist’s testimony); In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 
1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding that the language of 604(b) is permissive and not mandatory 
when the petitioner argued that the trial court should have ordered psychiatric tests in accordance 
with 604(a), 604(b) and 605); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1977) (finding that where the parties agreed to consult with a psychologist and agreed 
that he would present a recommendation to the court, the appointment of the evaluator was not 
reversible error on the part of the trial court). 
157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d at 1017 (stating that the trial court did 
not err in accepting the 604(b) report as substantive evidence because the doctor made his 
recommendations based on personal observation, interviews with the parties’ doctors, and 
interviews with and correspondence from the parties’ friends, neighbors, and family members); In 
re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d at 91 (finding that based on the record, the trial 
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appoint an evaluator, but nothing in the language of the statute requires 
the court to agree or disagree with the recommendation given by the 
evaluator.158  More importantly, there are no standards in assessing how 
much weight the evaluator’s opinion should be given.159 
Further, the statute does not require the evaluator to have any specific 
qualifications, but in most cases judges appoint mental-health experts 
such as psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers.160  The purpose 
of the statute is to give courts the option to appoint an evaluator in order 
to ascertain the best interests of the child, whether or not that results in 
following or rejecting the evaluator’s opinion.161  Even without any 
statutory requirement or clearly stated required qualifications for the 
evaluators, in most cases, courts tend to follow the evaluator’s 
recommendation.162 
 
court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though it went against 
some of the evaluator’s suggestions). 
158. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Saheb & Khazal, 880 N.E.2d 537, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) 
(stating that an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision simply because it decided 
not to follow all of a 604(b) evaluator’s recommendations and nothing in 604(b) requires a trial 
court to follow the advice of the evaluator); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1985) (noting that the testimony of psychologists and social workers are relevant in 
determining custody, but their opinions are not binding on the court). 
159. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (citing examples of courts grappling with 
how much weight to give evaluators’ opinions). 
160. See Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 335 (discussing the appellate court’s conclusion that the 
plain language of 604(b) provides no limitations or exceptions when the court-appointed expert 
witness is a psychiatrist or other mental-health professional, and stating that a court must not 
depart from this plain language by reading such an exception into the statute); see also id. at 336 
(stating that the term “professional personnel” is intentionally broad). 
161. See In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d at 396 (stating that in custody cases, the trial 
court is vested with great discretion because it has a better opportunity to observe the witnesses 
and determine the best interests of the child, and the testimony of psychologists and social 
workers are relevant to that determination, but their opinions are not binding on the court). 
162. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.Ed.2d at 1021 (affirming the trial court’s 
judgment which accepted and relied on the evaluator’s testimony); In re Marriage of Saheb & 
Khazal, 880 N.E. 2d at 547 (finding that the trial court implemented most of the evaluator’s 
recommendations but deciding not to implement all of the recommendations is not a ground for 
reversal); In re Marriage of Auer, 407 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (affirming the 
decision of the trial court which accepted the testimony of a psychologist as to the mother’s 
mental condition); In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming 
the order of the trial court which granted custody to the father and was consistent with the 
evaluator’s recommendation); People ex rel. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1977) (affirming the order of the trial court which found that, based on the evidence 
provided by the evaluator, the petitioner would be able to provide a more stable environment for 
the children and the children ought to remain together).  But see In re Marriage of Debra N. & 
Michael S., 4 N.E.3d at 90 (going against the evaluator’s recommendation by granting custody to 
the parent the evaluator believed would not serve the best interests of the child); In re Marriage of 
Bailey, 474 N.E.2d at 396 (discussing the trial court’s decision to depart from the advice from the 
evaluator because it believed the evaluator’s recommendation was not in the best interests of the 
children involved). 
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In 2011, the Supreme Court of Illinois was faced with a different type 
of dispute from those that Illinois courts previously faced.  The court in 
Johnston v. Weil found that the evaluations, communications, reports, 
and information obtained pursuant to section 604(b) are not confidential 
under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality 
Act when the evaluator is a mental-health professional such as 
psychologist or psychiatrist.163  This decision differed from most 
disputes arising out of section 604(b) as most disputes arose from the 
appointment of an evaluator and whether or not the court chose to 
follow the evaluator’s recommendations.164  In Johnston, an ex-wife 
filed a complaint against her two ex-husbands, the child’s appointed 
representatives in the divorce proceedings, and her ex-husbands’ 
attorneys alleging that they violated the Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act by disseminating 
information obtained by the 604(b) evaluator.165  The court held that 
section 604(b) limited disclosure of the evaluator’s report to the parties 
in the particular proceeding and provided no limitations or exceptions 
when the professional is a mental-health professional.166  The court 
further found that the 604(b) evaluator’s report was not privileged 
because the ex-wife was being evaluated for forensic purposes, not for 
mental-health purposes from a therapist in a therapeutic context.167 
B.  How California Crafts Its Statute 
Section 730 of the California Evidence Code is the substantive rule 
that gives California courts the authority to appoint an expert to evaluate 
the facts and circumstances surrounding a disputed child-custody 
request.168  In 1999, California became the first state to promulgate 
statewide Rules of Court that set forth all necessary components of a 
court-ordered child-custody evaluation and the ethical rules that all 
evaluators must follow.169  Today, California still remains the only state 
to enact such rules.170 
California Rule of Court 5.220171 governs court-ordered child-
 
163. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 332. 
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the court used its 
discretion in deciding whether to consider evaluators’ recommendations). 
165. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 329–30. 
166. Id. at 330. 
167. Id. 
168. CAL. EVID. CODE § 730. 
169. Philip M. Shahl & Lorraine Martin, An Historical Look at Child Custody Evaluations 
and the Influence of AFCC, 5 FAM. CT. REV. 42, 43 (2013). 
170. Id. 
171. CAL. R. CT. 5.220. 
NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:44 PM 
890 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  46 
custody evaluations and delineates several requirements for the 
responsibility for evaluation services; the scope of evaluations; 
cooperation with professionals in another jurisdiction; evaluator 
qualifications, training, continuing education, and experience; the 
service of the evaluation report; and cost-effective procedures for cross-
examination of evaluators.172  The Rule further requires each court in 
California to adopt a local rule in order to implement Rule 5.220,173 and 
requires a child-custody evaluator to consider the best interest of the 
child within the scope and purpose of the evaluation, strive to minimize 
the potential for psychological trauma to children during the evaluation 
process, and include in the initial meeting with each child an age-
appropriate explanation of the evaluation process.174 
Moreover, all evaluations are required to include a written 
explanation of the process that clearly describes the purpose of the 
evaluation,175 procedures used, and time required to gather and assess 
the information.176  If psychological tests will be used, the written 
explanation must clearly describe the role of the results in confirming or 
questioning other information or previous conclusions, scope and 
distribution of the report, limitations on the confidentiality process, and 
cost and payment responsibility for the evaluation.177  The Rule also 
provides that, in the data collection and analysis process, the evaluator 
may review pertinent documents related to custody, including local 
police records; observe the interaction between the parents and child; 
interview the parents; conduct age-appropriate interviews; observe the 
children with their parents; and consult with other experts to develop 
information that may be outside the evaluator’s area of expertise.178 
Ethical duties for child-custody evaluators include maintaining 
objectivity, providing and gathering balanced information for both 
parties, and controlling variables for bias.179  They must not offer any 
 
172. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(c)–(j). 
173. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(d)(1)(A)(i). 
174. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
175. See In re Marriage of Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 586–87 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding that the order appointing the evaluator was “woefully inadequate” because it failed to 
define the purpose and scope of the evaluation at all, and the evaluator could have corrected the 
trial court’s error by supplying a written protocol describing the purpose of the evaluation and 
explaining the procedures he intended to follow as required by California Rule of Court 
5.220(e)(1)(A)). 
176. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(1)(A)–(B). 
177. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(1)(B)–(E). 
178. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(e)(2)(A)–(F). 
179. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(h)(1); see In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 
102–03 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding that because the court awarded the mother sole custody based on 
the evaluator’s biased report and on a child statement which may have been influenced by the 
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recommendations about a party unless that party has been evaluated 
directly or in consultation with another qualified neutral professional, 
and they must operate within the limits of their own experience and 
must disclose any limitations or bias that may affect the evaluators’ 
ability to conduct the evaluation.180 
California Rule of Court 5.225 governs the requirements for 
appointing child-custody evaluators and is divided into fifteen parts and 
numerous sub-parts that thoroughly explain the requirements for 
licensing, education, training, experience, procedures for selecting an 
alternative evaluator, the use of interns, and evaluator 
responsibilities.181  Under the Rule, in order to become an evaluator, a 
person must be licensed as a psychiatrist, psychologist, marriage and 
family therapist, or clinical social worker.182  If a person is not so 
licensed, the rule provides that the person may be appointed if there are 
no other certified evaluators who are willing and available to perform 
custody evaluations within a reasonable amount of time, the parties 
stipulate to the person, and the court approves the person.183  Further, a 
child-custody evaluator is required to complete forty hours of education 
and training on topics including psychological and developmental needs 
of children; family dynamics; and the effects of separation, divorce, 
domestic violence, sexual abuse, and physical, emotional, and substance 
abuse.184  Child-custody evaluators must complete at least four partial 
or full court-appointed child-custody evaluations within the preceding 
three years and each of the four evaluations must result in a written or 
oral report.185  In addition to the licensing, education, and training 
requirements, a court-appointed evaluator is required to complete 
continuing education and training requirements in order to remain 
eligible for appointment.186 
A court-appointed evaluator must submit a declaration of compliance 
with all of the applicable education, training, and experience 
requirements; inform each adult party of the purpose, nature, and 
method of the evaluation; and provide information about the evaluator’s 
 
evaluator’s bias, the custody order denying the father’s motion to remove the evaluator was 
reversed).  According to the court, impartial objectivity is a critical requirement for a section 730 
child-custody evaluator.  Id. at 99. 
180. CAL. R. CT. 5.220(h)(3) & (6). 
181. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(a); see Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 23. 
182. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(c)(1)(A)–(D). 
183. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
184. CAL. R. CT. 5.255(d)(1)–(3). 
185. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(g). 
186. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(i)(1). 
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education, experience, and training.187  An evaluator is also required to 
use interview, assessment, and testing procedures that are consistent 
with generally accepted clinical, forensic, scientific, diagnostic, or 
medical standards.188  In addition to providing for the qualifications of 
the evaluator, the Rule also delineates qualifications of interns if used in 
the custody evaluation process.189  Interns must be enrolled in a 
master’s or doctorate program or have obtained a graduate degree 
qualifying for licensure or certification as a clinical social worker, 
marriage and family therapist, psychiatrist, or psychologist.190  The 
interns must be currently completing or have completed the necessary 
coursework to qualify for their degree in the subjects of child-abuse 
assessments and spousal or partner abuse assessment.191 
C.  How Pennsylvania Crafts Its Statute 
Pennsylvania’s statute, while much less comprehensive than 
California’s, includes more administrative language that would allow a 
court to reasonably interpret the legislature’s intent of how the 
evaluation process should proceed.192 
Rule 1915.8 of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
The court may order the child(ren) and/or any party to submit to and 
fully participate in an evaluation by an appropriate expert or experts.  
The order, which shall be substantially in the form set forth in Rule 
1915.18, may be made upon the court’s own motion, upon the motion 
of a party with reasonable notice to the person to be examined, or by 
agreement of the parties.  The order shall specify the place, manner, 
conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persons by 
whom it shall be made and to whom distributed.193 
The statute additionally provides that upon entering an order 
directing an evaluation pursuant to the Rule, the court must consider all 
appropriate factors including the allocation of costs, execution of 
appropriate authorizations and consents to facilitate the examination, 
any deadlines imposed regarding the completion of the examination, the 
production of any report and underlying data to counsel, and any 
additional safeguards that are deemed appropriate as a result of alleged 
domestic violence or child abuse.194 
 
187. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(l). 
188. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(l)(3). 
189. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m). 
190. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m)(2)(A). 
191. CAL. R. CT. 5.225(m)(2)(B). 
192. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a)–(d). 
193. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a). 
194. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a)(1)–(5). 
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Further, the expert is required to give the court any copies of any 
reports arising out of the evaluation, including the findings, results of all 
tests given, diagnoses, and conclusions.195  The evaluator is subject to 
cross-examination by all counsel, regardless of who obtains or pays for 
the evaluation.196  If a party refuses to obey an order of the court made 
under subsection (a) of the rule, the court is allowed to enter an order 
disallowing the disobedient party to support or oppose any designated 
claims or defenses and prohibit the party from introducing into evidence 
certain testimony or documents.197  Willful failure or refusal to comply 
with an order entered pursuant to the rule may give rise to a finding of 
contempt, and the court may impose sanctions as it deems 
appropriate.198 
Unlike Illinois’ statute, Pennsylvania’s refers to a substantive form 
that must be filled out when ordering an expert child-custody 
evaluation.199  It provides whether the evaluator shall or shall not make 
specific recommendations for legal custody, depending on what the 
parties decide.200  Further, it mandates that the parties fully participate 
with the evaluator on a timely basis, and that the evaluation be covered 
by insurance if it is medically necessary.201  The form additionally 
states that the evaluator may consult with and interview anyone who the 
evaluator reasonably believes can provide relevant information, 
including other experts and fact witnesses.202  Additionally, the 
evaluator is allowed to consult with other qualified professionals 
without court approval.203  Similar to Illinois and California, 
Pennsylvania’s statute also states that the evaluation report must be 
made available to counsel and the evaluator must be subject to cross-
examination by all counsel.204 
D.  Conclusion 
Comparing Illinois’ statute granting courts authority to conduct an 
evaluation for child-custody purposes to other states provides a context 
for where Illinois stands in relation to other states, and sheds light on its 
 
195. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(b). 
196. Id. 
197. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(c). 
198. Id. 
199. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(a); see PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18 (providing the form to be used for 
the order of the court in directing expert evaluation in a custody matter pursuant to Rule 1915.8). 
200. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(3). 
201. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(4)–(5). 
202. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(8). 
203. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(9). 
204. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.18(11), (13). 
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lack of detail and comprehensiveness.205  California has the most 
comprehensive statute, as it is the only state that has promulgated 
necessary components of a child-custody evaluation and the ethical 
rules that all evaluators must follow.206  Pennsylvania’s statute, while 
having more substance than Illinois’, still fails to have the level of detail 
that California’s statute provides.207  Illinois fails to provide any 
guidance, as it grants authority to the courts without delineating any 
necessary components of a child-custody evaluation or ethical duties of 
evaluators.208 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The development of the “best interest of the child” standard has led 
mental-health professionals to increasingly become part of the decision-
making process in custody cases in order to provide an objective 
analysis of the child’s psychological state to aid the court in determining 
the best interests of the child.209 
To determine the child’s psychological state and what custody 
decision is in his or her best interest, most mental-health professionals 
conduct psychological evaluations.210 Typically, comprehensive 
psychological evaluations are conducted on each parent, child, and 
potential stepparent.211  The mental-health expert’s role is to provide a 
 
205. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to 
follow in the course of the evaluation). 
206. Shahl & Martin, supra note 169, at 43. 
207. Pennsylvania’s statute does not include ethical duties of the evaluator; any licensing, 
training, or experience requirements for evaluators; and it does not require a detailed explanation 
of the evaluation and procedures used. 
208. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to 
follow in the course of the evaluation). 
209. See H. D. Kirkpatrick et al., Psychological and Legal Considerations in Reviewing the 
Work Product of a Colleague in Child Custody Evaluations, 8 J. CHILD. CUSTODY 103, 104 
(2011) (describing the custody evaluator’s role); Shuman, supra note 65, at 136 (explaining the 
transformation of the role of mental-health professionals in child-custody determinations); see 
also McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28 (stating that increased attention is given to using 
psychological tests in child-custody proceedings as a result of the growing area of psychological 
expertise in court). 
Psychological testing of parents in custody cases (for intelligence, personality, and/or 
psychopathology) has been described variously as of no utility, of dubious value, 
potentially useful when performed selectively and only when a clear need is identified, 
and one of the better indications of a parent’s true feelings and intentions.  Rarely are 
opinions of this type offered with any empirical support or with reference to any 
particular psychological tests. 
GRISSO, supra note 87, at 200 (internal citations omitted). 
210. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28. 
211. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 28; see Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 158 
(explaining the goals of psychological testing in custody determinations). 
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neutral and objective evaluation of the parents and children and make 
recommendations to the court based on the psychological best interests 
of the child.212  This role requires mental-health experts to assess the 
connection between the child’s developmental and socio-emotional 
needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs.213  When 
psychological tests are employed in a forensic context, it is the duty of 
the expert to use methods that are valid, reliable, and relevant to the 
ultimate issue in the litigation.214  In the context of child-custody 
proceedings, a psychological test is relevant if it provides data that will 
help guide the determination of what the best interests of the child 
actually are.215 
The American Psychological Association (“APA”) first published its 
guidelines for child-custody evaluations in divorce proceedings in 
1994.216  The APA guidelines stressed the need for multiple methods of 
collecting data, cautioned against over-interpreting or inappropriately 
interpreting the data in the evaluation process, and emphasized the 
importance of parenting capacity, the needs of the child, and the 
resulting “fit” in assessing the child’s best interests.217 
The way in which child-custody evaluations are conducted by 604(b) 
evaluators is problematic, because section 604(b) lacks clear guidelines 
that would provide consistency in the outcomes of custody cases,218 the 
 
212. Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 63; Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 
209, at 104; see American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations 
in Family Law Proceedings, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 863 (2010) [hereinafter Guidelines for 
Child Custody Evaluations] (“Psychologists render a valuable service when they provide 
competent and impartial opinions with direct relevance to the psychological best interests of the 
child.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
213. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; see Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations, 
supra note 212, at 864 (stating that the most useful and influential evaluations focus upon skills, 
deficits, values, and tendencies relevant to parenting attributes and a child’s psychological needs). 
214. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29; see Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra 
note 93, at 265 (suggesting that mental-health professionals consider the reliability of a test 
before using it in a psychological evaluation); Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in 
a Child-Focused Approach to Child Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 99 (1995) (discussing 
how mental-health professionals have been criticized for going beyond the limitations of 
scientific knowledge in custody cases). 
215. McCann et al., supra note 122, at 29.  If the test measures anything other than the best 
interests of the child, it is not valid in the context of child-custody proceedings. 
216. Francella A. Quinnell & James N. Bow, Psychological Tests Used in Child Custody 
Evaluations, 19 BEHAV. SCI. L. 491, 492 (2001).  See generally Guidelines for Child Custody 
Evaluations, supra note 212 (discussing the 2010 version of the APA’s child-custody evaluation 
guidelines). 
217. Quinnell & Bow, supra note 216, at 492.  The APA guidelines have continued to stress 
the same ideas over the years.  See generally Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations, supra 
note 212 (discussing the 2010 version of the APA guidelines for child-custody evaluations). 
218. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4. 
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science behind certain psychological tests used in evaluations lacks 
reliability, validity, and relevance,219 and the lack of guidelines 
exacerbates the potential risks of evaluator bias.220  Further, evaluators’ 
opinions tend to directly affect the outcome of the decision, which is 
problematic because their opinions are often based on the faulty results 
that arise when CAIs are conducted in forensic contexts.221  These 
problems call into question the utility of using CAIs such as the MMPI-
2 in child-custody evaluations to help the court come to a determination 
regarding the best interest of the child.222  This Part first addresses the 
lack of guidelines for 604(b) evaluators regarding the scope of their 
evaluation.223  Then, it analyzes how certain psychological tests may be 
unreliable, invalid, and biased when used in a family court setting.224  
Lastly, it analyzes the direct effects that evaluators’ opinions have on 
the custody decision.225 
A.  Lack of 604(b) Guidelines for Illinois Courts 
The language of section 604(b) is vague and leaves much room for 
interpreting what is and is not allowed during the appointment 
process.226  Section 604(b) merely states that the court “may seek the 
 
219. Id.  But cf. STANLEY KISSEL & NELSON W. FREELING, EVALUATING CHILDREN FOR 
COURTS USING PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 5 (1990). 
[Testing] can provide information . . . to determine fitness in being able to parent 
adequately. . . .  Psychological testing can also reveal the emotional makeup of the 
child and parents and can provide information about such dimensions as maturity, 
antisocial tendencies, propensity to anxiety and depression, and dangerousness to self 
and others. . . .  Psychological testing may provide important information regarding 
which parent may be more capable to raise a child and also in resolving visitation 
issues. 
Id. 
220. The lack of guidelines leads to psychologists and other mental-health professionals 
utilizing faulty psychological testing and administration, and research has demonstrated that the 
particular professional conducting the tests can affect the outcome of the tests based on their 
biases.  See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the effect that psychologists have on the outcome of 
psychological tests). 
221. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing how the judiciary’s heavy reliance 
on expert testimony results in most expert opinions being the dispositive factor in child-custody 
cases). 
222. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4. 
223. See infra Part III.A (analyzing section 604(b)’s lack of guidelines for Illinois courts to 
follow in the course of the evaluation). 
224. See infra Part III.B (discussing the unreliability and biased nature of CAIs in family court 
settings). 
225. See infra Part III.C (analyzing the direct effects of using court-appointed mental-health 
experts in child-custody cases). 
226. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (2014) (“The court may seek the advice of 
professional personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis.”). 
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advice of professional personnel” but does not provide further 
explanation as to what that entails; rather, the statute only uses vague 
language that grants courts the discretion to appoint an evaluator to help 
in the determination of child custody.227  When Illinois courts choose to 
appoint an evaluator, psychologists or psychiatrists are usually 
appointed even though they are not required, and the evaluator has free 
reign to employ whatever method he or she chooses in conducting the 
evaluation and report.228  The Illinois Supreme Court even expressly 
stated that section 604(b) does not provide any limitations or exceptions 
when the appointed professional is a mental-health professional.229 
 Another issue is that section 604(b) does not provide a minimum 
level of training or education and therefore implies that someone with a 
low level of knowledge and skills about conducting psychological 
evaluations could complete the evaluation.230  Furthermore, no rules 
require a certain level of experience in evaluators.231  It is necessary for 
Illinois to set minimum experience requirements because the quality of 
the evaluator affects the overall quality of the evaluation itself.232 
 In addition to the lack of requirements regarding experience, section 
604(b) lacks any rules regarding time constraints for the evaluation 
process.233  Under the language of section 604(b) and the lack of 
guidelines that steer the evaluation process, an evaluator could 
 
227. See id. (“The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or not 
employed by the court on a regular basis.”); Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ill. 2011) 
(“[T]he term professional personnel is intentionally broad” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 3 (“The lack of clarity in ‘the best interest of the child’ 
standard is only further compounded by the fact that there is nothing within the IMDMA that 
defines the term ‘professional’ specifically within the context of [child-custody evaluations], nor 
is there any instruction as to acceptable methods for execution of the evaluations.”). 
228. See supra Part II.A. (discussing what happens in practice when Illinois courts appoint an 
evaluator pursuant to section 604(b)). 
229. Johnston, 946 N.E.2d at 337. 
230. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 4; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (allowing 
the court to “seek the advice of professional personnel,” but not establishing minimum credentials 
for the professional personnel). 
231. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (omitting a 
requirement that professional personnel have a certain level of experience). 
232. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 5. 
233. Compare Katherine J. Baker, Addressing the Pre-Admission and Extrajudicial Use of 
Child Custody Reports, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 155, 170–74 (2010) (discussing the 
research that discusses both the positive and negative implications of having a mental-health 
professional versus a lay person providing observational data to the court), and Kirkpatrick et al., 
supra note 209, at 105 (opining that research shows there are reasons to be concerned about the 
quality of child-custody evaluations given the wide variance in the evaluators’ training and 
experience to conduct what may be the most complex and difficult forensic mental-health 
evaluation); with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (omitting any requirement that professional 
personnel have a certain level of experience). 
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theoretically choose to spend one hour with the child and parents before 
reaching a decision.234  Nothing in the statute even states that interviews 
must be conducted, although interviews are usually part of the 
evaluation process.235  Further, the lack of guidelines is problematic 
because there is no consistency with which to apply the statute in 
practice: Illinois courts can appoint whomever they want236, and the 
evaluator can essentially do whatever he or she wants in the evaluation 
process.237  Because section 604(b) lacks guidelines regarding 
requirements for evaluators’ experience, training, education, and time 
constraints for the evaluations, courts are left to interpret the statute as 
narrowly or broadly as they see fit, and it makes it difficult to 
adequately control the evaluation process.238 
B.  Unreliability and Biased Nature 
of Clinical Assessment Instruments in Family 
Court Settings 
This Subpart first analyzes the likely flawed validity and reliability of 
CAIs when used in child-custody proceedings.239  It then proceeds to 
 
234. This does not usually happen in practice, but the statute allows for it based on its plain 
language.  See infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing cases where an evaluators’ 
interview with parties was considered in the evaluator’s final recommendation). 
235. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lonvick, 995 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) 
(describing how the court-appointed evaluator met with the parties on multiple occasions and 
conducted several interviews with different people, ultimately recommending that the father be 
granted sole custody of the child); In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 4 N.E.3d 78, 80–81 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (stating that the court-appointed licensed clinical psychologist interviewed 
both parents and observed their interactions with the child in addition to observing the child’s 
interactions with her stepbrother and half brothers); In re Marriage of Bhati & Singh, 920 N.E.2d 
1147, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (discussing how the court-appointed clinical psychologist 
interviewed all of the relevant parties, visited the parties’ homes, and spoke with the child’s 
teacher and daycare provider); In re Marriage of Bailey, 474 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) 
(stating that the psychiatrist interviewed both the parties and the children); In re Marriage of 
Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that the court-appointed psychologist 
interviewed each child separately and then together with the father); People ex rel. Rathbun v. 
Rathbun, 362 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that the court-appointed clinical 
psychologist interviewed the parties and all persons involved in the controversy). 
236. “Professional personnel” is the only limitation.  As long as the person is a “professional,” 
he or she can be appointed.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/604(b) (“The court may seek the advice 
of professional personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis.”). 
237. See Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 337 (Ill. 2011) (“[S]ection 604(b) of the 
[IMDMA] provides no limitations or exceptions when the section 604(b) professional is a mental 
health professional.”). 
238. A child-custody evaluation is a complicated process because numerous variables and 
sources must be considered.  It seems necessary that strict guidelines exist in order for the 
evaluation process to be tightly controlled and conducted consistently throughout custody cases. 
239. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that CAIs are likely flawed in both validity and 
reliability when used in child-custody proceedings because these tests were not designed and 
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analyze the flawed administration of these tests.240 
1.  Flawed Validity & Reliability 
Based on the results of meta-analyses, the validity estimates for the 
Rorschach and MMPI were not significantly different.  The tests can be 
considered an adequate measure of psychometric properties if used for 
the purposes for which they were designed and validated.241  Meta-
analyses that have been used to support the Rorschach test have been 
flawed by way of not analyzing validity and reliability separately.242  
Further, research has shown that the Rorschach is not as valid as the 
MMPI, and the incremental validity of the Rorschach is poor.243  In 
fact, the academic community has recognized the Rorschach’s flaws, 
and some researchers propose deemphasizing it in the graduate school 
curriculum in favor of stronger emphasis on courses about judgment, 
decision making, and the use of structured interviews.244 
The value of a psychological test parallels its validity, and a valid test 
only has meaning if we acknowledge the purposes for which it is 
valid.245  Despite this qualifying characteristic of validity, many 
psychologists make the mistake of assuming that a psychological test is 
valid for any kind of evaluation.246  Thus, the issue of using a test 
 
validated for use in that context). 
240. See infra Part III.B.2 (identifying why the administration of these tests in the child-
custody context is flawed). 
241. See Howard N. Garb et al., The Validity of the Rorschach and the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory: Results From Meta-Analyses, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 402, 402 (1998) (exploring 
the flaws in specific meta-analyses of the Rorschach and MMPI tests).  Although these studies are 
from 1988 and therefore more than twenty-five years old, their methodology is still accurate, and 
their fundamental critique remains unchanged. 
242. Id. 
243. Id.; see Bow et al., supra note 143, at 38 (stating that the prevailing view is that objective 
tests are more valid and reliable than projective tests, and that the scoring and interpretation of 
objective tests is less ambiguous and controversial than projective tests); B. K. Clark, Acting in 
the Best Interests of the Child: Essential Components of a Child Custody Evaluation, 29 FAM. 
L.Q. 19, 31 (1995) (opining that if projective tests such as the Rorschach are used in custody 
cases, they should be used with extreme caution because of their lack of validity, reliability, and 
level of subjectivity used in their interpretation); Mel Hamel et al., A Study of Nonpatient 
Preadolescent Rorschach Protocols, 75 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 280, 284–290 (2000) 
(finding that above-average children without any history of mental illness appeared to be 
psychotic, clinically depressed, cognitively impaired, or highly resistant to establishing and 
maintaining relationships on the Rorschach test). 
244. Garb et al., supra note 241, at 402; see Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 164 (describing 
criticisms of the Rorschach based on its questionable validity and reliability in measuring 
psychological constructs). 
245. Terrence W. Campbell, Challenging Psychologists and Psychiatrists as Witnesses, 73 
MICH. B.J. 68, 71 (1994).  For example, an IQ test may be valid for purposes of predicting future 
academic success, but it is not valid for diagnosing brain abnormalities. 
246. Id. 
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designed to detect personality disorders and other psychopathologies in 
an evaluation of a child’s best interest presents itself.247 
An ideally valid test for purposes of child-custody litigation would 
accurately measure the best interests of the child.248  Unfortunately, the 
“best interest of the child” construct is so subjective and value-laden 
that it is impossible to accurately measure it in a forensic assessment 
evaluation.249  The “best interest of the child” needs an operational 
definition in order to be tested for, and given that no specific operational 
definition exists, validating a psychological test that aims to predict 
what is in the child’s best interests is theoretically impossible.250  There 
are plenty of tests that aim to measure some aspect of personality, but 
speculating as to how that personality characteristic would result in 
superior or inferior parenting is beyond the scope of these tests.251  No 
psychological tests have been validated to directly assess parenting 
ability,252 and given the complex nature of relationships and parenting, 
it is not surprising that no test is available to determine parents’ abilities 
and what arrangements would be in the child’s best interests.253  
Because the ideal test does not exist, evaluators use CAIs that do not 
measure the “best interest of the child.”254 
The MMPI, for example, was developed to screen for severe 
psychopathologies such as depression and schizophrenia.255  The MMPI 
involves the correlation of individual MMPI profiles with group MMPI 
 
247. See supra Part I.D. (discussing the difference between different assessment instruments 
and how CAIs are designed to be used a therapeutic context). 
248. Any personality test, such as the MMPI-2, is not valid in the context of child-custody 
proceedings because it cannot accurately measure the best interests of the child, even if they are 
valid for diagnosing personality disorders. 
249. Shuman, supra note 65, at 143.  What is in the best interests of one child will not be the 
same as what is in the best interests of another child; therefore, each parent’s definition of the 
“best interest of the child” will vary by case. 
250. Id.; see MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559 (commenting that tests of intellectual 
capacity, achievement, personality style, and psychopathology assess clinical constructs that are 
linked only indirectly, at best, to the key issues concerning custody and visitation). 
251. Shuman, supra note 65, at 143; see Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, 
at 68 (discussing how an evaluator who attempts to use a therapeutic evaluation for forensic 
purposes extrapolates the implications about legal capacities from mental-state information that 
may be insufficient for such a determination). 
252. Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in a Child-Focused Approach to Child 
Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 105 (1995); Shuman, supra note 65, at 144. 
253. Shuman, supra note 65, at 144.  Psychological tests that assess clinical constructs may be 
helpful if the child needs to be tested for a learning disability or if there is an issue about whether 
the child has a serious mental disorder, such as depression. 
254. These tests include the MMPI-2, MCMI, and Rorschach, and they are the most widely 
used psychological tests in child-custody litigation.  They measure psychopathologies such as 
personality abnormalities and depression, rather than the best interest of the child. 
255. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145. 
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profiles, and using the MMPI in child-custody evaluations to predict 
how a parent’s profile will affect his or her children requires drawing 
inferences that are well beyond the original design of the test.256  The 
MMPI does not measure whether a person is a good or bad parent, and, 
though it may provide reliable information about parents’ personalities, 
there is no scale that predicts what custodial arrangements are in the 
child’s best interests.257  Concluding that the best interests of a child can 
be measured by certain findings of parents’ personalities and 
psychopathologies is an unwarranted extrapolation from what the test is 
designed to measure and is pure speculation.258 
In addition, though there are no studies that correlate personality 
attributes identified by the Rorschach with good parenting, the test is 
still frequently used in custody litigation and infrequently challenged.259  
No cases address whether, when, or how the Rorschach should be used 
in child-custody evaluations.260 
Further, the forensic context in which these tests are used threatens 
their validity because of the coerced nature of the assessment.261  
Examinees do not take these tests voluntarily, and they have added 
incentive to misrepresent their statements and be less than candid.262  
 
256. Id.; see BENJAMIN M. SCHUTZ ET AL., SOLOMON’S SWORD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 69 (1989) (“It requires many inferential leaps to 
connect [traditional tests] with parental competencies we are attempting to measure.”). 
257. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145.  Again, this is because each case is subjective and what is 
in each child’s best interests will vary. 
258. See Brodzinsky, supra note 86, at 218 (“There is a clear need for standardized 
assessment procedures that are geared specifically to the issues confronting the child custody 
evaluator.  Such procedures, though, whether they are clinician-administered tests or self-report 
questionnaires, must have proven reliability and validity for forensic purposes.  Unfortunately, 
the current array of tests and questionnaires typically used by custody evaluators does not meet 
these criteria.”). 
259. Shuman, supra note 65, at 148; see J. Reid Meloy et al., Authority of the Rorschach: 
Legal Citations During the Last 50 Years, 69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 53, 53 (1997) 
(finding between 1945 and 1995, the Rorschach was cited in 247 state, federal, and military 
courts of appeal, and 26 cases were identified in which the reliability or validity of the Rorschach 
data were at issue); Irving B. Weiner et al., Is the Rorschach Welcome in the Courtroom?, 67 J. 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 422, 422 (1996) (finding that in a survey of 7934 federal and state 
court cases in which psychologists presented Rorschach testimony, only 6 challenged the 
appropriateness of the test); Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in 
Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY 
DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 157, 165 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987) 
(“Projective measures have not been shown to have the requisite psychometric properties to 
render them reliable or valid for predicting custodial functioning.”). 
260. Shuman, supra note 65, at 148. 
261. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 46. 
262. Id.; see Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 68 (stating that when 
forensic evaluations are conducted pursuant to child-custody litigation, examinees have a clear 
motivation to minimize psychopathology or negative characteristics).  The tests have control 
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These tests are designed to assess a voluntary test subject, and the 
distinction skews the results.263 
Given how often the MMPI is utilized in custody proceedings, it is 
ironic and shocking how rarely the courts address how it should be 
used.264  One would think that the validity and reliability of a 
psychological test in child-custody proceedings would be an important 
analysis before resorting to its use; courts, however, have ignored the 
fundamentals and methodologies.265  Hundreds of decisions refer to an 
expert’s use of psychological tests such as the MMPI-2 and MCMI, but 
only a handful of decisions raise the issue of the tests’ underlying 
reliability or validity.266 
Another threat to the validity of psychological testing in child-
custody contexts is a concept called test-item transparency.267  This 
term refers to the ease with which test subjects can distinguish what 
aspects of their perceptions, emotions, cognitions, or patterns of 
behavior are likely to be revealed by their answers to specific test 
questions.268  When test subjects can easily figure out what will be 
revealed about them by their responses to certain test questions, they 
can offer responses that will generate data, which when scored and 
interpreted will create the impression that suits what they want to 
portray.269  To try and combat this, some test items are included for the 
sole purpose of measuring test subject’s attempts at “impression 
management.”270  Test subjects on the receiving end of psychological 
questioning and evaluations likely believe that their interests will be 
best served if they can successfully create an image that is consistent 
with their litigation strategy.271  In the context of child custody, litigants 
are “motivated to endorse statements descriptive of virtues not 
 
scales for deception, but they are not perfect. 
263. See Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation, supra note 69, at 68 (opining that it is 
reasonable to assume that an examinee in a therapeutic context is describing his or her experience 
and symptoms accurately because he or she has an interest in seeking improvement or recovery; 
however, exceptions exist when an examinee feels coerced and is concerned about what his or her 
test results will reveal in a forensic setting). 
264. Shuman, supra note 65, at 145. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 146.  But see In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(finding that the use of the MCMI in determining that the father was a child molester was 
questionable given the fact that the test was designed for clinical rather than forensic purposes). 
267. David A. Martindale & James R. Flens, Test Item Transparency: The Undisclosed Threat 
to Test Validity, 29 THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 3 (2011). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 4. 
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characteristic of [them] and reject as not applicable statements that may, 
in fact, provide accurate descriptions of psychological problems 
experienced by them.”272 
2.  Flawed Administration 
Tests such as the MMPI-2 and MCMI provide manuals with specific 
instructions on how to administer, score, and interpret each test.273  Past 
research on child-custody evaluations utilizing the MMPI-2 and MCMI 
raise questions not only about the tests’ effectiveness, but also about 
their implementation.274  Such areas of concern include unmonitored 
test administration, underestimation of the test readability level, lack of 
verification of computer-entered data, over-reliance on computer-
generated interpretive reports, and use of inappropriate significance 
cutoffs.275  All psychological tests require a relatively quiet setting free 
from distractions, and, to the extent that the testing instructions and 
administrative conditions are less than ideal, the performance on the 
tests will be less than ideal.276 
A psychologist who conducts the psychological test can heavily 
influence the results because a psychologist’s expectations affect the 
way he or she administers and scores the test.277  For example, a 
psychologist who views his or her test subject as smart will assign them 
a higher IQ score than when he or she views the subject as 
unintelligent.278  Research also shows that African-American males 
obtain a higher IQ score when their examiner is African-American 
compared to Caucasian.279 
While it is reasonable to assume that mental-health experts are 
 
272. Id. 
273. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 39; see FRIEDMAN, ET AL., supra note 119, at 163 (stating 
that because administering the MMPI-2 is relatively easy, many professionals overlook important 
factors that tend to influence the participants’ test-taking attitudes and contribute to invalid 
results). 
274. Bow et al., supra note 124, at 39. 
275. Id. 
276. Heilbrun, Role of Psychological Testing, supra note 93, at 266. 
277. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71.  But see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 163 
(discussing how the test participants often believe the test is not important so they compromise 
their cooperation by reading the test items too quickly and lessening their overall investment in 
the task.). 
278. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71; see, e.g., Harold E. Schroeder & Dennis L. Kleinsasser, 
Examiner Bias: A Determinant of Children’s Verbal Behavior on the WISC., 39 J. CONSULTING 
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (1972) (finding that the test subject’s total verbal IQ scores were 
significantly affected by the expectations of the evaluators). 
279. Campbell, supra note 245, at 71; Francis Terrell et al., Effects of Race of Examiner and 
Cultural Mistrust on the WAIS Performance of Black Students, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 750, 750 (1981). 
NATHAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:44 PM 
904 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  46 
experts in their clinical judgments based upon their level of education, 
training, and experience, this is often not the case.280  Typically, 
psychologists and psychiatrists evaluate their patients by comparing 
how close their patients’ symptoms correspond to the disorder being 
tested.281  However, some of these symptoms occur in people without 
mental disorders and it is therefore difficult to discriminate between 
someone with or without a disorder because both types of people exhibit 
these symptoms.282  Tests that measure abnormal personality such as 
the MMPI-2 detect sub-clinical presence of personality characteristics 
that are present in the general population and are only of clinical 
concern when they surpass a certain level.283 
Psychologists and psychiatrists often find evidence of abnormality 
because they expect to find it, not because the abnormality actually 
exists.284  During interviews, these mental-health experts question their 
subject in a way that biases the information received.285  Assumptions 
about some aspect of a subject’s life, such as drinking or marriage, 
increase the number of questions the expert will ask about these topics, 
and as a result the expert will find the answers for which they are 
looking.286 
Psychologists and psychiatrists often reach their diagnostic 
conclusions very early on in their interviews, and they tend to adhere to 
their conclusions even when contrary evidence manifests itself.287  They 
overestimate the amount of information they utilize in their evaluations, 
and they believe they weigh multiple factors, when in fact they rely only 
upon a minimal amount of data.288  Research shows that mental-health 
experts arrive at their conclusions within minutes of an evaluation, 
 
280. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68. 
281. Id. 
282. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 161. 
283. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 161. 
284. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; see Dana B. Sattin, Possible Sources of Error in the 
Evaluation of Psychopathology, 36 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 99, 99 (1980) (finding that the 
perception of mental illness occurred for all subjects when mental illness expectancies were 
high). 
285. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68. 
286. Id.; see Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to 
Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323, 323–26 (1981) 
(discussing five impediments to accurate clinical judgment: inability to assess co-variation, 
influence of preconceived notions, lack of awareness of one’s judgmental processes, 
overconfidence, and hindsight bias). 
287. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Lee N. Robins & John E. Helzer, Diagnosis and 
Clinical Assessment: The Current State of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 409, 
424 (1986). 
288. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; J. Gillis & T. Moran, An Analysis of Drug Decisions in 
a State Psychiatric Hospital, 37 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 32, 39–41 (1981). 
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sometimes in as quickly as thirty seconds.289  Additionally, there is no 
correlation between mental-health experts’ level of confidence that they 
express in their conclusions and how accurate their conclusions are in 
fact.290  For example, errors in predicting dangerousness by 
psychologists and psychiatrists range from fifty-four percent to ninety-
four percent, with an average of eighty percent.291  Mental-health 
experts may also engage in impulsive questioning that biases the 
collected data rather than adhering to a well-prepared set of questions 
that would allow them to obtain the most relevant and comprehensive 
information possible.292 
Mental-health experts may overlook their patients’ strengths and 
resources that would enable them to deal with their psychopathological 
issues and assume that certain symptoms manifest in most other 
circumstances of their patients’ lives.293  However, people tend to adjust 
well to certain life situations despite the fact that they may struggle with 
other situations.294 
C.  The Direct Effect on the Custody Decision 
The use of court-appointed mental-health experts in child-custody 
proceedings without any guidelines for their methods and procedures 
has altered expert authority and their role in custody cases.295  The 
recommendations that 604(b) evaluators give have a considerable 
amount of influence on the course of the custody litigation.296  Many 
courts accord a significant amount of weight to the opinions of these 
evaluators, and this often results in acceptance of the recommendations 
without challenge.297 
 
289. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; J. Yager, Psychiatric Eclecticism: A Cognitive View, 
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 736, 736–41 (1977). 
290. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; Robyn M. Dawes, Representative Thinking in Clinical 
Judgment, 6 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV., 425, 425–41 (1986); Danny Wedding, Clinical and 
Statistical Prediction in Neuropsychology, 5 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 49, 49–55 (1983). 
291. Campbell, supra note 245, at 68; John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Criminal 
Behavior: A Methodological Critique and Prospectus in Deterrence and Incapacitations: 
Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, in NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFERENCE SYSTEM 244, 246 (1978). 
292. Campbell, supra note 277, at 69; Robins & Helzer, supra note 287. 
293. Campbell, supra note 245, at 69. 
294. Id.; C. Wilkinson & W. O’Connor, Human Ecology and Mental Illness, 139 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 985, 986 (1982). 
295. Shuman, supra note 65, at 159. 
296. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 157. 
297. Baerger et al., supra note 104, at 35; see Peter Ash & Melvin Guyer, The Function of 
Psychiatric Evaluations in Contested Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 25 AM. ACAD. CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 554, 557 (1986) (finding an eighty-five percent concordance rate 
between the expert’s recommendation and the judge’s decision). 
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A study that examined 282 contested child-custody cases found that 
an evaluator recommendation was the primary factor that directly 
affected the judges’ decisions.298  Later, a study examining judges’ 
perspectives regarding child-custody evaluations conducted by mental-
health professionals found that most judges believed child-custody 
evaluations had a significant impact on their decision making, and 
judges’ rulings were generally consistent with evaluator 
recommendations.299 
As analyzed above, these recommendations are not necessarily 
reliable or founded on good methods, and this poses a great threat to the 
outcome of the child-custody decision when the evaluators’ 
recommendations have such a significant role in the evaluation 
process.300  Because section 604(b) lacks clear guidelines for courts to 
follow in their evaluation processes, evaluators are free to employ any 
method in conducting their evaluations, and this can lead to choosing 
questionable methods.  These methods have been proven invalid and 
unreliable in the context of child-custody proceedings.  Moreover, 
judges tend to let evaluators’ recommendations influence their ultimate 
custody decision, and this is problematic when the recommendations are 
based upon faulty psychological testing.  The end result is a custody 
decision based upon the results of testing that has been proven incapable 
of ascertaining what courts seek to determine in child-custody 
proceedings: the best interest of the child. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
Illinois courts should enact strict statutory guidelines for the 
appointment of 604(b) evaluators in order to reduce the risk of evaluator 
bias and gain more control over the evaluation process in general.301  
Furthermore, CAIs302 should not be used in child-custody proceedings 
because they were designed for use in therapeutic assessment rather 
than forensic assessment and their validity and reliability have been 
 
298. Carla C. Kunin et al., An Archival Study of Decision-Making in Child Custody Disputes, 
48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 564, 564 (1992).  The study found that judges were influenced by 
recommendations sixty percent of the time, and were influenced fifteen percent of the time by an 
inferred measure of child preference. 
299. Erika M. Waller & A. E. Daniel, Purpose and Utility of Child Custody Evaluations: 
From the Perspective of Judges, 32 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 24 (2004). 
300. See supra Part III.B.1–2 (analyzing the flawed validity, reliability, and administration of 
CAIs in child-custody proceedings). 
301. See infra Part IV.A (examining the need for structured guidelines in appointing 
evaluators). 
302. Psychological tests that were initially developed to be used in assessment, diagnosis, and 
treatment planning in therapeutic contexts. 
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severely questioned in the context of child-custody proceedings.303 
A.  Necessary Guidelines 
Illinois courts should use their power304 to enact local rules: (1) 
requiring all child-custody evaluations to narrowly define the scope of 
their evaluation; (2) setting minimum education and experience 
requirements for evaluators; and (3) barring the evaluator from giving 
an opinion regarding the ultimate legal issue before the court.305  An 
ideal solution would be to adopt a rule similar to that of California Rule 
of Court 5.225, because it has proven effective.306  For example, in In re 
Marriage of Seagondollar, a mother and father were given shared 
custody of their four minor children.307  The father appealed from a 
post-judgment order changing the arrangement and giving his ex-wife 
sole custody and allowing her to move away with her children.308  
During trial, the court appointed a doctor to conduct an evaluation, who 
ultimately recommended that the children be allowed to relocate with 
their mother.309  The court of appeals found that the order appointing 
the child-custody evaluator was “woefully inadequate” because even 
though it specified that an evaluator would be appointed, it failed to 
define the purpose and scope of the evaluation, and the evaluator could 
have corrected the trial court’s error by supplying a written protocol 
describing the purpose of the evaluation and explaining the procedures 
he intended to follow.310  As a result, the court reversed the post-
judgment custody modification and remanded the matter to the lower 
court.311 
Another case that further illustrates the effectiveness of the California 
statute is In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., in which the parties, 
including the child, agreed to submit to a full psychological examination 
by a doctor so he could make a recommendation regarding custody.312  
The court of appeals found that because the lower court awarded the 
mother sole custody based on the evaluator’s biased report and on a 
statement made by the child that may have been influenced by the 
 
303. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the use of CAIs should be limited). 
304. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 22(h) gives local circuits the power to enact certain local 
rules.  ILL. S. CT. R. 22(h). 
305. Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 22. 
306. Id. at 23. 
307. In re Marriage of Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 576 (Ct. App. 2006). 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 579. 
310. Id. at 586. 
311. Id. at 587. 
312. In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 87 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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evaluator’s bias, the custody order denying the father’s motion to 
remove the evaluator was reversed.313  The court stressed that impartial 
objectivity is a critical requirement for a section 730 child-custody 
evaluator.314  Additionally, the court acknowledged that one of the 
reasons the Judicial Council adopted the California Rules of Court 
establishing uniform standards of practice for court-ordered child-
custody evaluations is because the results of child-custody evaluations 
are generally given great weight by the judge in deciding contested 
custody issues.315 
These cases illustrate the effectiveness that strict statutory guidelines 
have on the outcome of child-custody cases.316  In both cases, the Court 
found that the guidelines were not adhered to and properly remanded 
the cases to the lower court so the errors could be remedied.317  This 
kind of appellate remediation is not possible with the current status of 
Illinois’ statute because there is nothing preventing Illinois courts from 
conducting evaluations a certain way.318  California has crafted its 
statute such that strict requirements are in place, and California 
appellate courts are prepared to identify when and where these 
requirements are not followed.319 
Illinois should also draw from the Pennsylvania statute because it 
provides that if a party refuses to obey an order of the court, the court is 
allowed to make an order disallowing “the disobedient party to support 
or oppose any designated claims or defenses” and prohibit the party 
from introducing into evidence certain testimony or documents.320  
Also, under the Pennsylvania Rule, willful failure or refusal to comply 
with an order may give rise to a finding of contempt, and the court is 
allowed to impose sanctions as it deems appropriate.321 
Illinois would benefit from adopting highly structured and detailed 
 
313. Id. at 85. 
314. Id. at 99. 
315. Id. 
316. See infra notes 307–12 (examining the cases In re Marriage of Seagondollar and In re 
Marriage of Adams and Jack A.). 
317. In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 85; In re Marriage of 
Seagondollar, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 587 (Ct. App. 2006). 
318. California’s statute explicitly states that the order for an evaluation must state the 
purpose and scope of the evaluation.  CAL. R. CT. 5.220.  Therefore, if the order does not include 
the requisite information, it will be inadequate until it is remedied. 
319. California Rule 5.220 breaks down the rules for court-ordered evaluations, ranging from 
section (a) through (j).  CAL. R. CT. 5.220(a)–(j).  California Rule 5.225 sets forth the 
appointment requirements for child-custody evaluators, ranging from section (a) through (o).  
CAL. R. CT. 5.225(a)–(o). 
320. PA. R. CIV. P. 1915.8(c). 
321. Id. 
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rules such as California’s, and the threat of sanctions and disallowing a 
party from introducing certain evidence would provide an incentive for 
parties to be as cooperative as possible.322  If Illinois courts adopted 
child-custody rules that had a similar level of detail to the California 
Rule and sanctioning requirements in the case of willful failure to 
comply like those in the Pennsylvania statute, child-custody evaluations 
would be better controlled and less susceptible to invalidity caused by 
unqualified evaluators and lenient standards of protocol.323 
B.  Abolishing the Use of Clinical Assessment Instruments 
In Favor of Forensic Assessment Instruments 
in Child-Custody Proceedings 
Given the threats to the validity and reliability of CAIs in child-
custody contexts, it seems most obvious that these tests should not be 
allowed in child-custody proceedings.324  In a situation where the child 
has a learning disability or serious mental disorder, use of a CAI such as 
the MMPI-2 or Rorschach should be permitted, as these CAIs were 
designed to measure such issues.325 
Proponents of using CAIs in child-custody evaluations believe it can 
provide useful information in determining parental fitness, revealing the 
emotional makeup of the parents and child and providing information 
about maturity, antisocial tendencies, anxiety, depression, and 
dangerousness.326  More importantly, proponents believe that it may 
provide important information regarding which parent is better able to 
raise the child.327  While CAIs can provide information about traditional 
psychological constructs such as anxiety and depression, no test directly 
measures functional parenting abilities.328  There are some CAIs that 
test for certain parental attitudes and belief, but there is not enough 
 
322. It is important that the Illinois Rules are structurally organized and comprehendible like 
the California Rules because detailed rules that are structurally disorganized and laden with legal 
jargon would not do any good for the courts or the evaluators subject to them. 
323. See Grund & Kestnbaum, supra note 4, at 23 (“The California Rule is detailed enough to 
steer the child custody evaluation process in the right direction, yet flexible enough to comport 
with the realities of the justice system.”). 
324. Erickson et al., supra note 64, at 170–71.  But see Robert P. Archer et al., Introduction to 
Forensic Uses of Clinical Assessment Instruments, in FORENSIC USES OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENTS 14 (Robert P. Archer ed., 1st ed. 2006) (stating that CAIs may be used for forensic 
purposes when they appropriate and relevant to the specific legal question). 
325. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 560. 
326. STANLEY KISSEL & NELSON W. FREELING, EVALUATING CHILDREN FOR COURTS USING 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 5 (1990); MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558. 
327. KISSEL & FREELING, supra note 326, at 5; MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558. 
328. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; SCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 256, at 69; Roseby, 
supra note 252, at 105. 
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evidence to link these attitudes with actual behavior.329  Additionally, 
projective measures such as the Rorschach have not been proven valid 
or reliable for predicting custodial functioning.330   
Therefore, while proponents of CAIs in child-custody proceedings 
are correct in identifying the psychological constructs they can identify, 
it is an unwarranted extrapolation to suggest that the results of 
traditional psychological tests designed to test for something other than 
parenting ability can shed light on that legal competency.331  Tests that 
measure psychopathologies are relevant in the context of therapy and 
diagnosing mental illness, however they have no place in a forensic 
setting when its purpose is to determine what custodial situation is best 
for a child.332 
In the place of CAIs, FAIs are more favorable psychological 
instruments because they are specifically designed for use in the legal 
system to determine what the data says about psychological constructs 
and how they relate to the relevant legal competency at issue in the 
litigation.333  Rather than having CAIs provide data about an 
examinee’s personality and have an evaluator make an inference as to 
what that means about what situation is in the child’s best interest, the 
evaluator will have data that were directly obtained through a test 
“designed to conceptualize the relationship between legal definitions of 
abilities and psychological constructs associated with human 
capacities.”334 
In addition to using FAIs, evaluators should conduct comprehensive 
observation and interviewing of the parents, children, extended family, 
teachers, and babysitters, as such people are in the best position to 
discuss custodial preferences and any special needs of the children.335  
Special attention should be given to the parents’ ability to cooperate, the 
nature and intensity of disagreements about the children, and potential 
areas of compromise.336  Further, the parent-child relationship should be 
observed in the child’s principal home, as this will provide the most 
 
329. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; SCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 256, at 69. 
330. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558; Weithorn & Grisso, supra note 259, at 165. 
331. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 559 (“Tests of intellectual capacity, achievement, 
personality style, and psychopathology assess constructs that are linked only indirectly, at best, to 
the key issues concerning custody and visitation.”). 
332. Id. 
333. GRISSO, supra note 87, at 34–35. 
334. See GRISSO, supra note 87, at 33 (discussing the conceptual objective of FAIs). 
335. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558. 
336. Id.; see Bow & Quinnell, supra note 10, at 164 (opining that it is imperative for 
evaluators to consider developmental issues, strengths, and weaknesses of the parents and current 
custody research in the evaluation process). 
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realistic idea of the family dynamic.337 
Ensuring high quality child-custody evaluations is important because 
the focus of the evaluation is to ascertain what is in the child’s best 
interest; therefore, these evaluations should be neutral, valid, and 
conducted consistently in order to fulfill the evaluator’s legal obligation 
to protect these interests.338 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of common-law and statutory guidelines for section 604(b) 
evaluations leaves evaluators free to employ any method whatsoever in 
coming to a conclusion about child-custody determinations, and this 
often leads to the use of invalid clinical psychological tests that judges 
tend to cling to in the courtroom.  Judges, who can validate their 
decisions by the use of “expert” opinion, tend to lean in favor of 604(b) 
evaluators’ opinions and often let their ultimate custody decisions stem 
from the potentially invalid and biased findings of these tests.  This 
ultimately may lead to placing children in a less-than-ideal situation, 
which goes against one of the main objectives of the IMDMA: 
mitigating the potential harm to spouses and their children caused by 
the process of legally dissolving the marriage.  Without clear guidelines 
for 604(b) evaluators to follow in the course of their evaluations and the 
abolishment of CAIs in these proceedings, Illinois courts run the risk of 
making custody decisions based on an inaccurate picture of the child’s 
environment, parents’ psychological capabilities, and the child’s 
psychological capabilities.  While preventing divorce and its negative 
effects is impossible, Illinois can ensure, by way of airtight guidelines 
and the non-use of CAIs, that children involved custody disputes do not 
needlessly suffer at the hands of a legal system devoid of a 
comprehensive way of ensuring that their best interests are protected. 
 
337. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 558. 
338. Bow & Quinnell, supra note 10, at 164. 
